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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Securing the Gulf: Towards an Integrated Maritime Security
Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea

Degree:

Master of Science

The resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in 2007 greatly affected the economy of
some West African states especially Nigeria and Benin. The severity of attacks by
pirates led to United Nations Security Council resolution 2018 (2011) expressing deep
concern about the threat posed by piracy in the region and an intention for a cooperative
regional action to combat this maritime security crime .
Despite current efforts by some states in the region to curb piracy, this maritime security
challenge still persists. Some factors identified as fuelling piracy include weak
legislation, inadequate capacity of coastal navies, proliferation of small arms and
unemployment. To combat piracy in the region certain challenges identified as obstacles
to cooperation need to be addressed. These include lack of political will, inadequate inter
agency coordination, influence of extra regional powers and poor maritime domain
awareness amongst others.
This dissertation analyses the challenges to cooperation in the region as well as the
strengths and limitations of the countermeasures implemented in other piracy hotspots
such as Southeast Asia and Somalia. Particular attention is given to the Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in
Asia( ReCAAP) and Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) with a view to suggesting a
maritime security strategy in the Gulf of Guinea as called for by the United Nations.
Key words: Piracy, Maritime Security, Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria, Benin, Regional
Cooperation.
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Chapter 1
1 - Introduction
1.1 - Background
Piracy in its various forms have posed a threat to trade and shipping for millennia
(Mejia, Cariou & Wolff, 2010, p.2). Cilician pirates raided the Mediterranean in the age
of Classical Greece and Rome, and the Vikings pillaged and terrorized the coasts of
Europe. Pirates also roamed the waves of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean (Havern,
2012).
Historically, efforts to suppress maritime piracy were characterized as acts of littoral
warfare rather than constabulary or police action (Kraska, 2011a). In 67 BC, Roman
general, Pompeius Magnus, was given authority to purge the Mediterranean seas of
pirates. The General was given the wherewithal for three years and had overriding
authority in all provinces for up to fifty miles inland (Souza,2001). With the rise of
England in the early modern period, nations thinking about the concept of piracy as a
form of warfare faded. It led to the granting of letters of marque and reprisal,
governments issued licences authorizing private vessels to attack and capture enemy
vessels (Kraska, 2011a).
However in 1856, the Paris Declaration of the worlds’ maritime powers abolished letters
of marque. France and the United Kingdom signed an agreement to stop the granting of
letters of marque because of the difficulty in controlling privateers (Hutchins, 2011,
p.854). It was the confluence of naval technology, the maintenance of freedom of the
seas by the Royal Navy and the progress of international law that contributed to the
demise of maritime piracy. With the end of World War II, the hegemonic dominance of
the United States Navy assured freedom of the seas and the safety of maritime
commerce (Kraska, 2011a).
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After the cold war and by the late 1980s, decolonization and globalization were forming
the weak states and the shipping boom that would set conditions for a reemergence of
piracy in the 1990s and 2000s. The epicenter of the new piracy in the 1990s and early
2000s was Southeast Asia, but the center shifted to the Horn of Africa after 2005
(Kraska, 2011a).
Since 2007, much of the international efforts in combating piracy have been focused on
Somalia waters, after taking over the number one spot of global piracy from Southeast
Asia waters (Onuoha, 2012). According to Neethling (2010), of the almost 300 ships
that were attacked in 2008, 111 were around the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden.
Since 2009, attacks continued and a number of ships from various nations were seized
(Neethling, 2010.p.90). The spike in attacks prompted the deployment in 2008 of an ongoing international coalition of navies to fight Somali piracy (Onuoha, 2012)
The international focus on the challenges posed by Somali pirates, underscored the
momentous threat that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea posed to the states in the region and
international community as well (Pham, 2011). According to the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), 64 incidents of piracy were reported in 9 countries of the Gulf of
Guinea in 2011, up from 45 in 7 countries in 2010 (Baldauf, 2012). The reported
incidents are so severe that some attacks off Benin and Nigeria involve a ship being
hijacked and a significant part of its cargo stolen and losses from each attack range from
US$2 million to $6 million (Ichikawa, 2012). The resultant effect is that Nigeria and
other countries in the Gulf of Guinea are losing $2 billion annually to this maritime
crime (Okwe, 2012).
Further, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 10558 states that the
threat of piracy was fitting together with other forms of transnational organized crimes,
including oil bunkering, sea robbery, hostage-taking, human and drug trafficking and
terrorism. As a matter of necessity, the United Nations Security Council could not ignore
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the strategic economic importance of the Gulf of Guinea oil and the significant threat
piracy posed to that vital commerce (United Nations Security Council, [UNSC], 2012b).
As a consequence, UN Security Council Resolution 10558 clearly states that Gulf of
Guinea countries need to develop a comprehensive and integrated regional anti-piracy
strategy for the region (UNSC, 2012b). Supporting the UNSC resolution, Admiral Ola
Ibrahim, the Nigeria Chief of Defence Staff, stressed the need for a collective approach
on maritime security to protect the adjacent maritime environment since 38 out of 54
states in Africa have coastal fronts (Ibrahim, 2012, p.8).
Although every regional maritime security situation is unique, past experiences in other
regions can provide useful lessons in counter piracy operations for the Gulf of Guinea
efforts, especially antipiracy operations in Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)
and the Horn of Africa the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC). The negative effect
piracy is having in the Gulf of Guinea countries and the call for a comprehensive antipiracy strategy to counter piracy in the region motivated the researcher to embark on this
study.
1.2 - Aim
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the challenges to the Gulf of Guinea
countries in combating piracy and specific lessons associated with the successful factors
and challenges of regional agreements and countermeasures against piracy in Southeast
Asia and Horn of Africa with a view to proffering strategies.
1.3 - Statement of the Problem
The Gulf of Guinea is off the coast of West Africa and is a significant source of oil
(Baldauf,2012).The wider Gulf of Guinea comprises altogether 14 countries: Angola, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, São
Tomé and Príncipe, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and
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Sierra Leone (Basedau & Mähler, 2011, p.74). The region provides a huge market size
of about 300 million consumers of global trade and its maritime space facilitates 90
percent of West African international trade of 45.5 billion US dollars and 31.62 US
dollars of exports and imports respectively (Quashie, 2010, p.66).
As a result of increasing piratical attacks, the Gulf of Guinea maritime space is
becoming unsecured. For instance, the President of Benin sought the intervention of the
United Nations (UN) to address the issue. Benin was particularly affected by the piracy
scourge in 2011 with 20 attacks, which led to a 70 per cent drop in revenue from her
seaports and also affected movement of commodities to some landlocked countries in
the region. Recently, however, the Nigerian/ Benin Maritime Operation Prosperity
commenced to curb the activities of the pirates in Benin waters, with other current
efforts to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.These measures have not
been able to adequately tackle piracy and armed robbery at sea as the pirates still
continue their activities and have even extended their operations to Togo waters.
Further, there is a tendency for the pirates to further extend their operations to other
countries in the region with prospects of new oil finds and weak naval capabilities. The
Gulf of Guinea is losing about 2 billion dollars annually to piracy as earlier stated. The
emerging piracy threat, if left unchecked, can lead to instability in the sub region and
adversely impact on the region’s economic, social and political development. Also, the
Gulf of Guinea vast sea area presents great challenges to the navies of the sub-region's
member states. The weak enforcement capability of most of the navies in the Gulf of
Guinea exposes the vulnerable sea areas to exploitation.These suggest there is still more
to be done to suppress piracy in order to enhance maritime security. It is against this
backdrop that the study sought answers to the following questions:
a. In what ways can the impact of piracy on maritime security in the region
be evaluated?
b. What are the current efforts to curb piracy in the region?
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c.

Why has piracy in the region persisted despite some efforts at combating
it?

d. Are there cooperative maritime arrangements existing in other regions
relevant in providing useful insight for developing an integrated strategy
to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea?
1.4 - Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study will be to examine the different dimensions of piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea in order to propose strategies to tackle the menace.

Specific

objectives are to:
a. Understand the geo-strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea.
b. Analyse the trend of piracy in the region.
c. Identify factors responsible for rise in piracy in the region.
d. Identify the impact of piracy in the region.
e. Identify some current efforts to curb piracy.
f. Identify challenges hampering efforts to combat piracy in the region.
g. Identify existing cooperative arrangements that address piracy.
h. Proffer strategies to combat piracy in order to enhance maritime security.
This dissertation aims to serve as a reference for policymakers and stakeholders of
member states who are responsible for defence and security within the Gulf of Guinea
sub-region. Additionally, the study is expected to contribute to knowledge, fill gaps in
the literature on maritime defence and serve as resource material for future studies on
the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain.
1.5 - Scope

The scope of this study is defined by its time and space. In terms of time, the study
covers the period between 2001 and 2012 first quarter. This period was chosen because
of the rise of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea especially Nigerian and
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Benin waters. The

incidence of piracy assumed a pronounced dimension, prompting

efforts at the national and regional levels as well as attracting the attention of the UN,
evident in the adoption of UN Resolutions 2018 (October 2011) and 2039 (February
2012); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) efforts at
activating Operation Prosperity as a pilot test to foreground a regional maritime
framework.The space is defined by mostly the maritime space of Gulf of Guinea
especially the waters of Nigeria and Benin .
1.6 - Research Methods
The research was descriptive using logical reasoning and integrated data comprising
qualitative and quantitative data. Official documents and publications were consulted.
Also unstructured interviews with principal staff officers of the Defence Headquarters
and ECOWAS resource persons involved in maritime security in the Maritime Domain
of Nigeria and West Africa were conducted.
1.6.1 - Sources of Data
The sources of data for the research included both primary and secondary sources of
data.
1.6.2 - Primary Sources of Data
The primary data were collected through unstructured interviews, discussions and
consultations with some principal officers of the Nigerian Defence Headquarters, Benin
republic Navy and ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja. The list of those interviewed is in
Appendix A.
1.6.3 - Secondary Sources of Data
The secondary sources were materials gathered from books, journals, lectures notes,
magazines, periodicals and official publications. Others include published and
unpublished materials as well as information from the internet. In addition, official
documents were obtained from ECOWAS and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).
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1.6.4 - Method of Data Analysis
Qualitative method of data analysis was adopted using logical reasoning to arrive at
cogent deductions. Quantitative methods involved analysis of statistical data and
inference was made from the unstructured interviews.
1.6.5 - Method of Data Presentation
The analysed data was presented in a descriptive form. Tables, maps, charts and
diagrams were also used for illustration.
1.7 - Organization

The research is organized into five chapters. Chapter One is the introduction where the
objectives, research methods, research questions and the scope are stated. Chapter Two
reviews piracy literature in trends, development of piracy, contemporary piracy hotspots,
and analysis of piracy incidents .It also looks at relevant factors responsible for piracy,
impact and modus operandi of pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. Chapter Three looks at the
current efforts to combat piracy and challenges hampering efforts to combat piracy.
Chapter Four reviews existing regional arrangements to combat piracy and proffers
strategies to tackle piracy. Chapter Five will contain the discussions and conclusions of
the research.
1.8 - Limitation of the Study
The research was limited by inability to access some individuals programmed for
unstructured interviews. However, secondary data were used to fill the space to ensure
that the research objectives were achieved.
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Chapter 2
2 - Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
2.1 - Origin and Development of Piracy
To combat the menace of piracy, it is necessary to look at the origin and basic
development of this maritime crime. In some parts of the world piracy is seen as being
acceptable as a way of livelihood to supplement agriculture in some cases. The
alternative to piracy may well be hunger. Most reported pirate attacks involve the theft
of crew belongings or ships´ equipment which may include petty cash, radios, ropes or
even tins on paint. The perpetrators slip onboard ships in the cover of darkness and use
little violence if there escape is impeded (Abhyankar, 2005).
In addition, many attacks are not reported, because masters of vessels do not want any
unnecessary delay of vessels which may cost the ship more (IMB, 2001).Further, the end
of the cold war brought the reduction navies of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization(NATO) and the Warsaw Pact countries. The absence of these navies
reduced the deterrent effect on pirates especially in the South East region. Another factor
that has fueled the development of piracy is the fact that most third world countries are
battling under debt, which constrained there resources to acquire platforms to maintain
presence at sea as deterrence to pirates (Abhyankar, 2005).
2.2 - Definition of Piracy and Relationship with Maritime Security
Any study of piracy usually raises the issue of how the term is defined particularly when
it has to do with issues between state sovereignty and universal jurisdiction over crimes
(Mejia, Cariou & Wolff, 2008, p.104).Recognized international law, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) defines piracy in Article .101 as
consisting of any of the following acts:
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(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b). UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).
By the above definition, UNCLOS 1982 limits piracy to the two ship-model with private
gains motive occurring at high seas (Fajriyansah, 2007, p.112). In addition, the
definition did not take into cognizance the comprehensive legal regime of piracy within
domestic jurisdiction (Mbiah, 2010, p.306) .The IMO, as a specialized UN agency,
adopted the UNCLOS definition, but due to the recurrent issue of armed robbery in its
agenda for many years came up with the term`` armed robbery against ships’’ as well
(Mejia, 2002, p.33). Therefore, IMO in Article 2.2 of the Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC) Circular 984, defines armed robbery against ships as “any unlawful act of
violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of
"piracy", directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship,
within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences’’ (IMO, 2000).
On the other hand, Maritime Security is defined as measures employed by maritime
administrations, vessels owners and operators, port facilities, offshore installations and
other maritime organizations to protect against unlawful acts (Mukherjee & Mejia,
2005).Further maritime security ensures unimpeded sea trade, safe navigation,
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protection of coastal communities and their livelihoods and preservation of the rich
ecosystems in the ocean vital to wellbeing of the planet (Onuoha, 2010).
From the foregoing, maritime security has two aspects, protection of the environment
including the ecosystem, fish, sea mammals and safety of the users such as vessels and
operators. Hence any piratical act, like attacking a vessel laden with oil and leading to
pollution that degrades the integrity of the marine ecosystems, is considered a threat to
maritime security. Conversely, an act that negates the safety of operators or vessels that
use the sea legally, also affects maritime security (Onuoha, 2010). Thus from the
foregoing a clear link can be established between sea piracy and maritime security in the
sense that piracy is a threat and maritime security is the desired end state.
2.3 - Contemporary Global Piracy Hotspots
According to IMB the three hotspots of piracy and armed robbery against ships include
Southeast Asia, Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea (Mbiah, 2007, p.127). The
succeeding paragraphs will briefly discuss piracy in South East Asian and Somali (Horn
of Africa) waters before looking at the Gulf of Guinea in detail. See figure 1.
2.3.1 - Piracy in Southeast Asia
As a result of increased piracy attacks in Southeast Asia, the IMB in 1992 established
the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia (Murphy, 2007, p.21).
According to IMB statistics, cases of piracy increased drastically all over the world since
the late 1990s. The South East Asian maritime environment had the highest number of
piracy attacks, attributed to the 1997 Asian financial crises(Banlaoi,2005,p.62), with
almost half taking place in the Malacca and Singapore straits, the surrounding waters of
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (Kaneda, 2005, p.45).
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Abhyankar refers to piracy in Southeast Asia as `` Asian’’ piracy. This kind of piracy
takes place in the territories of the various countries where ships are boarded, and cash
and valuables are stolen from the ship and crew using minimum force (Abhyankar,
2002). Another variant of piracy committed in Southeast Asia is the theft or hijacking of
an entire ship.

Figure 1: Live Piracy Map showing hot spots(2008)
Source: http://bldgblog.blogspot.se/2008/11/piracy-live-at-sea.html

This is where ships were hijacked given false identity and turning them into “phantom
ships” with fake registration papers (Bateman, 2010, p.16).
2.3.2 - Piracy in Somalia
Failure of governance that resulted in the collapse of the Somali state since the ousting
of President Siad Barre in 1991 is at the root cause of piracy in Somalia. As a result,
Somalia’s coastline has been infested with militia groups who engage in piracy (Onuoha,
2009, p.37).The modus operandi of Somali pirates involve the preservation of hijacked
ship, crew and cargo to enhance bargain for ransom payment. The operators of the
piracy model involve fishermen, militia and investors (Mejia, 2010a). According to IMB
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reports, the Somali pirates use “Mother Vessels” as a means of transportation to attack
their preys (IMB, 2006). The use of pirate mother ships (fishing vessels converted to
pirate vessels) allow the pirates to extend their attacks up to 700nm offshore for
hijacking of ships even, oil tankers. For example three Thai fishing vessels were
hijacked 1200nm of the coast of Somalia; the furthest reported (Geiss & Petrig, 2010,
p.10). The extension of these attacks has caused a profound effect on sea trade and
seafarers alike. In 2011, Somali pirates attacked 237 vessels receiving an estimated US
dollars 160 million in ransom. The number of hostages and vessels held reached a peak
in February 2011, with reported 33 vessels and 733 hostages as being held by Somali
pirates. As at 19 March 2012, 13 vessels and 197 hostages were held by pirates
(Rhinehard, 2012, p.9).
2.4 - Understanding the Gulf of Guinea
Understanding the geostrategic setting of the Gulf of Guinea would be necessary before
looking at the dynamics of piracy in the region. The Gulf of Guinea starts from Senegal
to Angola with a distance of over 6,000 kilometer coastal arc which makes it a strategic
geo-maritime area (Onuoha, 2012, p.4). (See figure 2).

Figure 2.Map of Gulf of Guinea
Source: 321 Energy (http://www.321energy.com/editorials/engdahl/engdahl060506.html )
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The region is not only abundant in natural resources in oil and other hydrocarbons, but
also fish, cocoa and timber (Crippa, 2012).According to experts, the Gulf of Guinea will
surpass the Persian Gulf nations in the production of oil by 2020 (Paterson, 2007).
Estimates suggest the oil producing countries in the region will gain S200 billion from
oil earnings and S349 billion by 2019(Onuoha, 2009, p.246).Angola and Nigeria are the
biggest producers and have an output of around 2,000,000 barrels per day (bpd). CongoBrazzaville, Gabon and Equatorial-Guinea have extracted between 240,000 and 350,000
bpd. Equatorial Guinea started its production in the mid-1990s but Gabon is a longstanding oil producer. Cameroon’s oil production stands at about 77,000 bpd (2009). It
is less known that both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cote d’Ivoire are also oil
producers. Their current output is

relatively

small with 16,400 and 57,900 bpd

respectively ( Basedau & Mähler 2011, p.74) .Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone are the
next countries to enter the oil production and export business, with new deposits
discovered in their national waters in recent years (Crippa, 2012).
The international geostrategic importance of the oil and gas reserves in the region is
bigger today because the oil found in the Gulf of Guinea is of very high quality and can
be conveniently shipped to all major markets from there (Roll, 2011, p.14). For instance
Nigeria supplies 10 percent of shipment of oil to the United States (Paterson, 2007).
The ecosystem of the region is a source of global interest (Mane, 2005).Apart from oil
16 Gulf of Guinea and ECOWAS countries make up the Guinea Large Marine
Ecosystem (GLME) which provides nutrient rich ecosystems for fish, prawns and other
marine mammals to thrive. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
statistics, fish production in 2010 was 800,000 tonnes for commercial, industrial, and
subsistence fishing (Usoro, 2012, p. 56). Furthermore, the Gulf of Guinea benefits from
the absence of narrow maritime lanes known as chokepoints that make shipping
susceptible to blockades, pirate attacks, and shipping accidents (Mane, 2005, p.4). Hence
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a key hub of commercial maritime activities where growing investments in the region
mean that coastal trading and maritime traffic are bound to increase in the region. As
such maritime crimes like piracy, armed robbery at sea, drug trafficking, poaching and
pollution will tend to increase. The most immediate concern to maritime stakeholders
and the shipping industry is the threat posed by piracy and armed robbery against ships
(Onuoha, 2012, p.4). Therefore the next section analyses piracy attacks in the region
with a view to understanding the causes, consequences and remedies that may be needed
to put in place to secure the Gulf of Guinea.
2.5 - Analysis of Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
This section evaluates the piracy incidents from 1991 to the first quarter of 2012
(2012:Q1) based on statistics from the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
Annual Reports 2000-2012. The analysis provides a framework for the kind of remedial
actions that can be taken to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships. The analysis
would indicate the types of ships attacked, reasons for rise and decline of pirates attacks,
countries most affected and comparisons between countries, regions and Africa in order
to find the proportions of incidents from various categories.
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Table 1: Actual and Attempted Attacks against Ships in African and Gulf of Guinea waters between 1991 and 2012 (Q1)
Africa
Algeria
Angola*
Benin *
Cameroon*
Congo DR*
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea*
Eritrea
Gabon*
Ghana *
Guinea*
Guinea Bissau *
Gulf of Aden
Ivory Coast*
Kenya
Liberia*
Madagascar
Mauritania
Morocco
Mozambique
Nigeria*
Red Sea
Senegal *
Sierra Leone *
Somalia
South Africa
Tanzania
The Congo*
Togo*
Total(Gulf of Guinea Nations*)
Total (Africa)

1991

1992

1993

1994
1

1995

1996

3

1997

1998

1999

2000

1

1

1

3

3
1

5

3

2

1

2
1
1
1

2001
1
1
7
1
2

2002

2003

5

3
1
2

2004

4

2005

2

2006

2007

2008

4

1

2

1
3

1

1

2
2

2
3

4

4

2
4
2

3
2
6
1

1
7

5

2
2
6
13
5
5

1

2

2

5
7

1

4

9

3

12
1

14

6
3
5

2

1

2
3
4

9

14

1

2

3

4

3

3
2

2
6

4
20

17
24

31
41

3
5
3
1
11
9

1
1

20
41

36
55

1
1
2
9

19

9
1
2

1
3
8
1
7

1
32
67

1
3
2

2010

2011

2012

1
20

1

5
3
2

4
3

1

2
5

2

6

37
1
1

8
3

1
1

1
1
1

4
2

2
1

2009

7
5
2
2
11
5
2

3
4

5
5

3
1

3
4

1
2

7

18
2
1
1

8
4
1
2
1
2

10
3

10
1

13

92
3
2
1

3

53
85

1
14

1
39

3
1
6

8

1
45
71

3
1
5
1
64
93

4
1
1

1
1
1

1

28

16

5
3
2
2

1

3

1

56
73

12

1
3
42

1
2
40

35

2
10

2
31

7

9

11

25
80

1
31
61

53
120

3
5
1
117
2
1

53
4
1

29
15

19
25

10
39

1
10
7

19

80

139

1
160

28

14
1
1
59
189

5

1
1

2
48
266

39
259

3
6
53
293

Source: Adapted from International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)-International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
Annual Reports 2000 – 2012

*Gulf of Guinea Nations
*Q1- First Quarter
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1
2
17
64

Total
2
21
23
44
20
14
2
2
18
52
58
5
401
57
24
6
8
5
6
10
318
86
28
18
577
3
85
9
13
690
1915

2.5.1- Trend Analysis
According to statistics from the International Chamber of Commerce- International
Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships Annual reports,
there were a total of 1,915 pirate attacks in Africa between 1991-2012 first quarter, see
Table 1 showing ``Actual and Attempted Attacks against Ships in African and Gulf of
Guinea waters between 1991 - 2012 (first quarter)’’. As indicated in the table, there was
a gradual increase of attacks from 1996, with a double rise in 2007 and steady increase
till 2011. The figures rose from 120 in 2007 to 293 in 2011. This rise was attributed to
piracy off the Somalia coast, Gulf of Aden and Nigerian waters.
The Gulf of Guinea which is the focus of this dissertation accounted for 690 of the 1,915
attacks in African waters between 1991-2012 first quarter. This figure indicated a rise in
piracy and shows an uneven trend of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. There were no
reported attacks of piracy in 1991 and 1992 in the Gulf of Guinea. However, in 1993, 5
attacks were reported, that is 2 in Nigeria and 3 in Angola. Only 2 attacks were reported
in 1994 which rose to 4 in 1995. From this author`s personal experience in counterpiracy operations in Nigeria during the 1990s, it was widely accepted that the low
prevalence of piracy attacks could be attributed to the active presence and high
operational state of most naval forces in the region especially the Nigerian Navy. The
Nigerian Navy fleet at the time was highly operational and used for ECOWAS
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) Peace Support Operations in Liberia 1990-1999 and
Sierra Leone 1991-2002.
Reported attacks tripled to 17 in 1996, with a sharp rise to 31 in 1997 and dropped to 20
in 1998. The figures started an upward trend to 36 in 1999 and down to 32 in 2000.
Between 1996 and 2000, Nigeria had 37 attacks, followed by the Ivory Coast and
Guinea with 19 each, Cameroon 13, Ghana 12, and Senegal 11. In 2001, Nigeria, the
Ivory Coast and Cameroon with 19, 9, 7 attacks respectively accounted for 36 out of the
53 attacks that year. The attacks dropped to 45 in the Gulf of Guinea in 2002. However,
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in 2003, 64 attacks were recorded, which was the highest since 1993. Nigeria waters had
39 attacks and according to IMB were regarded as the most dangerous area in Africa for
piracy and armed robbery against ships. However, 2003 saw a drop in attacks in
Cameroon, Gabon and the Ivory Coast.
Looking at the table, there was a steep rise in attacks in Nigeria waters from 1993 to
2003. This could be attributed to deterioration of the Nigerian Navy Fleet endurance
patrol capacity as most of the ships could not be repaired after their long deployment for
the ECOMOG peace support mission. This situation affected the operational capability
of Nigerian Navy ships and hence left most part of the Nigerian territorial waters
unpatrolled favoring rise of piracy (Usoro, 2012, p.55).
With 28 attacks in Nigeria out of 56 reported in 2004, Nigeria was still regarded as the
most dangerous area for piracy in Africa and third in the world aside Indonesia and the
Malacca Straits. This was due to the increasing intensity of militant attacks in the Niger
Delta region (Nincic, 2009). The Gulf of Guinea recorded 25 attacks in 2005 and 31
attacks in 2006. Incidence of attacks in Nigerian waters witnessed a decline from 16 in
2005 to 12 in 2006.According to IMB, this drastic reduction was attributed to increased
law enforcement patrols and international pressure on some governments to act and
increased awareness and anti-piracy watches by ship Masters in risk prone areas. The
US government at the time gave Nigeria 4 warships between 2003 and 2004 to enhance
her patrol duties against pirates (Usoro, 2012, p.55).
However, According to IMB, Nigeria had the most kidnapped victims in 2006, 49
against foreign oil workers. Local politics in Nigeria had an impact in shipping that year.
This shows that whenever there is reduction in patrol, there is increase in piracy and vice
versa. There was significant increase to 53 attacks in 2007 and 59 in 2008 in the Gulf of
Guinea. Nigeria was responsible for a total of 82 attacks for the two years. According to
IMB, this rise was attributed to increase in militant activities in the Niger Delta region of
Nigeria, where the Movement of Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was carrying
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out attacks to protest the marginalization of the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta pirates
attacked vessels successfully using`` mother vessels’’ further out at sea as well as being
better armed, organized and coupled with absence of proper law enforcement. The rise
indicated a breakdown in the law enforcement capability of the country to address the
problem. In 2008 most attacks occurred in the territorial waters. By 2007, most of the
vessels obtained from the US were due for refit and thus affected their patrol capabilities
(Usoro, 2012, p.59).
There was a decline in 2009 and 2010 to 48 and 39 attacks respectively. According to
IMB reports, this was partly due to acquisition of new patrol boats and increased patrols
by the Nigerian Navy and the granting of amnesty to the Niger Delta militants in August
2009. The militants submitted most of their arms used in criminal activities. As a result
of aggressive patrols, piracy spilled into neighboring states especially Benin. The
increase of attacks to 53 in 2011 was attributed to the Niger Delta militants that rejected
the Nigerian government amnesty offer. Ten reports were received for Nigeria and an
increase in attacks in Benin to 20. It is interesting to note that from 1991 to 2010, Benin
had only 2 attacks. According to IMB reports, the upsurge in piracy attacks in Benin was
suspected to be carried out by pirates from Nigerian waters. Mohammed lends credence
to this statement and confirmed the assistance of Nigeria to tackle the pirates
(I.Mohammed, personal communication, September 10, 2012).
The pirates always operated in gang style fashion. According to the IMB Director, “The
attacks off West Africa follow a different modus operandi from pirate activity in other
parts of the world” (International Chamber of Commerce, 2012). A case in point was the
attack on Energy Centurion Tanker on 28 August 2012, which coincided with the UN
backed ECOWAS Maritime Security Conference, taking place in Togo at the time.
Pirates in Togo hijacked the tanker Energy Centurion with the 24 Russian crew on board
and siphoned 3000 tons of the gas oil cargo. They did not ask for ransom, but took the
crew’s valuables. The vessel was seized 27km off the coast of Lome, Togo´s capital
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.The hijackers steamed off with the tanker after a gunfight with the Togolese navy patrol
(Lowe, 2012).
Pirates’ attacks severely affected Benin economy and prompted the establishment of a
joint patrol codenamed Operation Prosperity by Nigeria and Benin navies. According to
IMB reports, first quarter of 2012, saw 10 reports of attacks in Nigeria, the same as
reported for the whole of 2011, and one reported for Benin, which has been attributed to
Nigerian pirates. The reduction in the number of attacks was due to the joint patrol effort
of the Benin – Nigerian Navies. The trend of piracy attacks shows a correlation between
patrol efforts and presence of the Nigerian Navy fleet at sea.
2.5.2 - Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea
This subsection puts the absolute number of incidents described above in charts and
graphs for better appreciation .Figure 3 shows trend of attacks actual and attempted
combined in the Gulf of Guinea from 1991 till first quarter of 2012. As described above,
there is an uneven trend with piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region. The chart
shows a steep rise of attacks from 1991 to 2003 (when it recorded the climax of
incidents accounting for about 9.3% of the total attacks within the period under review).
In 2004, there was a slight decrease in attacks which further decreased the following
year, but peaked again in 2006 with steady increase making another climax in 2008. A
gradual drop in attacks was recorded from 2009 to 2010, but, increased again in 2011.
Nevertheless, the first quarter of 2012 recorded about 2.5% of the attacks within the
period and has already surpassed 1991 – 1995 incidents, currently standing at about
32.1% of the total incidents recorded in 2011. This indicates that if proper mechanisms
are not put in place, 2012 may be worse hit by pirates’ attacks than 2011.
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Figure 3: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea from 1991-2012(Q1) (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy
Reports, 2000-2012.)

2.5.3 - Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country
Figures 4 and 5 shows the amount of attacks in percentage with respect to the countries
within the region. From 1991-2012(Q1), Nigeria recorded the highest number of piracy
incidents, accounting for about 46.1% of the entire attacks over the period; this was
followed by Guinea (8.4%), the Ivory Coast (8.3%), Ghana (7.5%), and Cameroon
(6.4%). However, Equatorial Guinea recorded the least attacks at about 0.3% of the total
attacks over the period.
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Figure 4: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports,
2000-2012.)
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Figure 5: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports,
2000-2012.)
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2.5.4 - Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country in 2011
Figure 6 and 7 show the trend of attacks in 2011. This year is particularly interesting
because Benin republic experienced a new phenomenon of piracy, which seriously
affected her economy (see cost of piracy). She accounted for

37.7% of the attacks in

2011; as explained earlier, these attacks prompted the President of Benin to seek the
urgent response of the UN that culminated to UNSC Resolutions 2018 and 2039 and the
establishment Joint Maritime patrol Operation Prosperity. Nigeria recorded (18.9%),
Togo (11.3%) and Guinea (9.4%). However, countries like Cameroon, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Senegal did not record any incident in 2011.
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Figure 6: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country for 2011 (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy
Report, 2012.)
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Figure 7: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country for 2011 (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy
Report 2012.)

2.5.5 - Reported incidents in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea
Figure 8 show an extensive evaluation of the piracy incidents in Africa and the Gulf of
Guinea.The Gulf of Guinea accounted for about 71.4% of the piracy attacks in Africa in
1993, which dropped drastically to 20% in 1995, with a sharp surge to 70.8% in 1996
which increased to 75.6% the next year. Although 2003 witnessed the highest piracy
incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, 2004 recorded the greatest contribution (76.7%) to
attacks from the region when compared to Africa. Nevertheless, the proportion of piracy
incidents from the Gulf of Guinea has been reducing gradually since 2005, with the Gulf
of Guinea accounting for about 26.6% of the incidents in the first quarter of 2012.
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Figure 8: Reported Incidents in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports,
2000-2012.)

2.5.6 - Reported incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria
Figure 9 reveals the proportion of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea that came from
Nigeria. By 1993, Nigeria accounted for about 40% of the incidents in the Gulf of
Guinea, which dropped to zero (0%) by 1994, rose again to 25% in 1995; and fluctuating
between 15% (1998) and 64% (2005). By 2007, Nigeria recorded the highest incidents
of attacks and accounted for about 79.2% of the attacks in the Gulf of guinea.
Nevertheless, this reduced gradually to 18.9% in 2011. However, considering 2012
separately, Nigeria accounted for about 58.8% of the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea for
the first quarter of 2012 already.
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Figure 9 Reported Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports,
2000-2012.)

2.5.7 - Reported incidents between Africa the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria
Figure 10 show the comparison of attacks between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and
Nigeria. In general, piracy incidents in Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria shared a
similar trend from 1991 to 2006, with a gradual increase from 1995 to 2003, and a
decrease in 2004 down to 2006. Nevertheless, while cases in Africa rose in 2007 to a
record high in 2011, incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria increased slightly in
2007 and also decreased steadily till 2010. Meanwhile, in 2011 piracy cases rose in the
Gulf of Guinea as Nigeria recorded a continued decrease from 2010.
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Figure 10. Reported Incidents between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual
Piracy Reports, 2000-2012.)

2.5.8 - Reported incidents between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria and Somalia
Figure 11 show a rise in piracy incidents in Africa, while attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
and Nigeria experienced a downward trend, incidents in Somalia rose to a record high in
2011 accounting for about 54.6% of the total attacks in Africa at the time.
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Figure 11: Reported Incidents in Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria and Somalia (Source: ICC-IMB,
Annual Piracy Reports, 2000-2012.)
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2.5.9 - Summary of Analysis of Attacks
The following conclusions can be made from the analysis of incidents:
Nigeria had the highest number of attacks (318) in the region during the period under
review. The findings indicated certain factors were attributed for the high number of
attacks. These include violent attacks carried out by armed Niger Delta militants from
Nigeria as a result of crisis in the Niger Delta region and poor operational state of most
Nigerian Navy ships. There was a strong correlation between naval patrols (maritime
security) and piracy. On the other hand, drop in piracy was also associated with social
programmes such as the amnesty programme instituted by Nigerian government. Other
measures that reduced piracy included international pressure, anti- piracy watches by
ship crews as well as acquisition of new naval platforms used for sustained patrols.
Therefore, apart from military measures, piracy could also be suppressed by sociopolitical means and adoption of best management practices by ships.
The findings also revealed that piracy is a transnational crime. The reduction in piracy in
Nigeria led to increase in another country, Benin and further extended to Togo. This
goes to show a regional approach in the form of a combined patrol and regional
agreement would be necessary to combat piracy and sea robbery. In addition pirates
seeking safe haven in other countries, could be stopped by arresting criminals if
adequate legislations are in place. A regional agreement could provide the platform for
hot pursuit and extradition. The analysis opens up challenges faced by countries in the
region. For example lack of naval capacity and poor technological base for repair of
ships. The subsequent sections will discuss in details some factors and impact of piracy
as well as the challenges faced by the region in combating piracy.
2. 6 - Factors responsible for rise in Piracy
Before commanders go to battle, a thorough assessment of the enemy’s strength and
weaknesses must be made in order to ensure victory. In this circumstance, it is important
that the causes and reasons for piracy are understood so that appropriate suggestions are
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made to tackle the maritime crime. Hence, there are several interrelated factors
responsible for the persistence of piracy. This section will look at some of these factors
peculiar to the Gulf of Guinea.
2.6.1 - Conflict and Disorder
Piracy and criminal activities flourish in coastal areas where there is civil strife and
disorder, or their aftermath (Murphy, 2009, p.168). West Africa has witnessed many
conflicts. The region remains fragile with Cote d’Ivoire recovering from civil war, and
crisis in Guinea and Guinea Bissau (Dokubo, 2010, p.144). The menace of piracy in
Nigeria is traced to the Niger Delta region. The Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta became a coalition of local groups of militants protesting marginalization in
Nigeria. The militants attacked vessels and oil platforms in and around the Niger Delta.
Over time, it became almost impossible to establish whether a piracy incident was
politically or criminally motivated as the perpetrators often operated interchangeably
(Crippa, 2011). Drug trafficking is another maritime crime fitting together with piracy
in the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea is becoming a major hub where a sizeable
amount of cocaine was seized around Cape Verde, the Canary Islands and Madeira in
vessels manned by crews from the sub-region (Gilpin, 2007). This state of conflict and
disorder tends to fuel piracy.
2.6.2 - Underfunded Law Enforcement/Inadequate Security
Many states are financially constrained to sustain navies, coast guards that can patrol the
length and breadth of their maritime environment thereby encouraging pirates to operate
with impunity (Murphy, 2009, p.168).These weak internal security forces, which are
under-trained, poorly equipped, incapable of effectively policing their internal waters,
are also badly in need of education on human rights (Goldwyn & Morrison, 2005).
Pirates take advantage of these shortcomings to commit crimes illegal activities
(Ibrahim, 2009, p.127).
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2.6.3 - Poor Governance and Permissive Political Environment
Poor governance is a factor that has fuelled rising incidences of insecurity in the region.
The social and economic upheaval that followed bad governance undermined national
and sub-regional security (Alli, 2010, p.70). To that end, and to promote good
governance and security in Africa, Dr Mo Ibrahim, a wealthy Sudanese mobile
communication businessman established a five million United States dollar prize for the
African President adjudged to be the best in terms of good governance (Alli, 2010,
p.70). Furthermore, piracy thrives where there are weak laws and lax law enforcement as
a result of a weak state. Permissive environments exist within states and their territorial
waters because the political environment is corrupt or allow illegal activity to take place
for its benefit, or because law enforcement is underfunded and as a result a criminal
organization can develop. The likelihood is that corrupt law enforcement officials are a
feature of all areas affected by piracy (Murphy, 2010, p.169).
2.6.4 - Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Illicit small arms and light weapons used by criminal gangs have intensified the lethality
of armed violence in West Africa (Golwa, 2010, p .119). The proliferation of small arms
in West Africa is as a consequence of current and past conflict zones, corrupt law
enforcement and military personnel selling their weapons as well as domestic artisan
production from Senegal, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria which passes down established
routes (Dokubo, 2010, p.145). For example there were an estimated 75,000 illegal craft
guns circulating in Ghana, constituting the vast majority of the 125,000 unregistered
weapons in the country (Kieli, 2008, p.7). Similarly, the Nigerian Maritime
Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) raised alarm over the influx of illegal
arms into Nigerian waters by some shipping firms involved in unauthorized mid-stream
discharge. The Director General of NIMASA explained that most of these arms and
ammunition are the same arms used by Niger Delta pirates and oil thieves (Oritse,
2012).
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2.6.5 - Unemployment and Poverty
Failure of poor government policies to provide basic necessities has made unemployed
youths ready hands for violent or criminal organizations. For instance, in Sierra Leone
where despite disarmament, the unemployed youths still jumped at another opportunity
to pick up arms in the Liberian Civil war (Dokubo, 2010, p.143).To support the earlier
mentioned statement, Mbiah (2007) describes paucity of legitimate employment
opportunities and general lack of regional economic development as a pull factor that
have encouraged coastal inhabitants to partake in crimes like maritime piracy (Mbiah,
2007, p.130). However, though statistics are unreliable, there is general agreement that
around 51 percent of the Niger Delta’s people still live on $2 or less a day, only 49
percent have access to safe drinking water and there is one secondary school for every
14,679 children (Newsom, 2011, p.5). These conditions could push individuals into
unproductive ventures. Table 2 illustrates the relative medium to low living standards in
the region which could indicate fertile ground for criminal acts like piracy.
Table 2: Human Development Index in the Gulf of Guinea

Country
Angola
Congo-Kinshasa
Congo-Brazzaville
Gabon
Equatorial Guinea
Sao Tome
Cameroon
Nigeria
Benin
Togo
Ghana
Cote d’Ivoire
Liberia
Sierra Leone

Human Development Index (HDI)
HDI- 2009
HDI-2010
Ranks (general level)
143 (medium)
146(low)
176 (low)
168(low)
136 (medium)
126( medium)
103 (medium)
93(medium)
118 (medium)
117(medium)
131 (medium)
127(medium)
153 (medium)
131(low)
158 (medium)
142(low)
161 (low)
134(low)
159 (low)
139(low)
152 (medium)
130(low)
163 (medium)
149(low)
169 (low)
162(low)
180 (low)
158(low)

HDI-2011
148( low)
187(low)
137(medium)
106(medium)
136 (medium)
144( low)
150(low)
156(low)
167(low)
162 (low)
135 (medium)
170 (low)
182(low)
180(low)

(Sources: Basedau, M., & Mähler, A. (2011); Human Development Index Reports (2010-2011))
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2.6.7 - Promise of Reward
The great financial reward of pirate activity has arisen as a motivator for this crime
(Otto, 2011). The promise of comfort and expensive cars often lure unemployed youths
to engage in piracy which has become a thriving business. (Nincic, 2009, p.7).
According to the confession of the alleged leader of the hijack of MT Energy Centurion
recently arrested, financiers of cargo oil theft business in Nigeria promised his gang 16
million naira( about102,000 US dollars) to hijack an oil tanker( Bilesanmi &
Amata,2012). Murphy (2010) notes that piracy is a low risk high paying job when
compared to other lines of work, pirates qualify for (Murphy, 2010).
2.6.8 - Favourable Geography
Favorable geography facilitates and even provides safe havens for pirates (Murphy,
2007, p.14). The geography of the Nigerian Delta region with many creeks and swamps,
make the region extremely difficult to police and thus enables pirates to escape after
committing illegalities (Ukeje, 2009, p.8).
2.6.9 - Crude Oil Theft and Illicit Bunkering
Fuelling piracy are organized crime syndicates operating major crude theft operations
from the Niger Delta in Nigeria. They are backed by well-armed and increasingly wellfinanced militias (David & Morrison, 2005). In addition, the complex geography of the
region, with a labyrinthine network comprising thousands of creeks and swamps and
existence of an established international market for stolen oil which involves partners in
the Gulf of Guinea (Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe)
encourages illicit bunkering providing cash or exchange for weapons (Obasi, 2011,p.59).
2.7 - Modus Operandi of Pirates
If any cooperative arrangement is going to be made to tackle piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea, it would be essential to know the modus operandi of the pirates.
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In the Gulf of Guinea, piracy has moved over the years from low-level armed robberies
to hijackings, cargo thefts, and large-scale robberies. Pirates often take hijacked tankers
to another empty tanker to collect its siphoned fuel to be sold on the black market. The
original vessel is then brought back and released (McNamee, 2012). A case in point
according to IMB 2011 report, took place on 13 September 2011, where a product tanker
MT Mattheos 1, was hijacked and attacked by armed pirates around 62 nautical miles
from Benin coast. The pirates took hostage of all the 23 crew members and hijacked the
tanker. They forced the master to sail to an unknown location, where the tanker was
ransacked and some items stolen. The pirates released the vessel after a few days.
With respect to the above-mentioned, pirate attacks are often violent and are carried out
by assailants armed with automatic weapons and using different types of small boats.
Most of the attacks are targeted at expatriates, many of whom are kidnapped for ransom
(Fouché, 2010a, p.154; IMB, 2006, p.17). In the words of Lieutenant General Victor
Malu, a former Nigeria Chief of Army Staff:
The boys in the creeks of Niger Delta operate with military precision and with all
the modern weapons of warfare. The skills with which they use these weapons of
warfare make people to believe that insiders and some influential people at the
top are behind them. More daring is the fact that these boys operate with satellite
phones to ease communication. They have modern guns and other high-tech
weapons and that is why they easily defy security. They are very strategic in their
activities. (Idehen, 2008, p.477).
The numerous attacks and hijackings of ships taking place in the Gulf of Guinea such as
the attack on MT Mattheos 1 are labeled as major criminal attacks by IMB reports.
According to Beckman (2002), this kind of criminal attack involves detailed planning
and organization. The attack can be described as a major transnational organized crime
at sea and are very serious because they involve great losses to ship owners, risk to lives
of crew and navigational safety (Beckman, 2002, p. 321).The IMB reports also state
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many attacks occur at ports, anchorages and coastal waters under the jurisdiction of Gulf
of Guinea coastal states. For example IMB 2007 report, specify 13 attacks against
anchored ships in Benin waters. By the definition of piracy in UNCLOS 1982, many of
these attacks cannot be classified as piracy, which as discussed earlier occurs at high
seas or the Exclusive Economic Zone. Therefore UNCLOS 1982 will inadequate to try
suspected pirates in territorial waters.
In 1985, an Italian Cruise liner Achille Lauro was hijacked by a Palestinian armed
terrorist group. The terrorists took control of the vessel and demanded for the release of
their confederates in Israel prisons. In course of the hijacking, an unarmed and disabled
passenger was killed and thrown overboard. This incident led IMO to develop the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA) 1988 (Mejia, 2007, p.173). According to Hesse (2007), the SUA
Convention provides the legal basis for action to be taken against persons committing
unlawful acts against ships, including seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against
persons on board ships, and the placing of devices likely to cause damage or destroy the
ship (Hesse, 2007,p.193). As earlier described, serious hijackings, seizures, exercise of
control by force and hostage taking against ships in the Gulf of Guinea could come
under the purview of offences of the 1988 SUA Convention. The SUA Convention is an
enabling law to repress serious pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. The next section will
discuss the cost and impact of the operations of these pirates in the Gulf of Guinea.
2. 8 - Economic Cost and Impact of Piracy
In terms of cost of piracy, One Earth Future Working Paper (2010) analyses the direct
economic costs of piracy, which include the following: the cost of ransoms, piracy
insurance premiums, deterrent equipment, re-routing vessels away from piracy risk
zones, naval deployments in piracy hot zones and piracy prosecutions (Bowden,2010).
This section will look at the relevant costs of piracy to the Gulf of Guinea.
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2.8.1 - Cost of Insurance
In reaction to the growing threat and cost of ransoms, the maritime insurance industry
has responded by increasing its shipping rates and premiums, especially in designated
high-risk piracy zones ((Bowden,2010).). Following increased attacks in the Gulf of
Guinea, the Joint War Committee, representing Lloyd’s of London underwriters and
other insurers, listed Nigeria, and Benin as higher risk for shipping on August 1, 2011.
The Nigerian risk zone now extends to 200 nautical miles. This implies additional cost
for ships entering Nigeria and Benin waters (Bockmann, 2011). Further, The
International Bargaining Forum, a body of seafarers, has warned its members to avoid
Nigerian waters as they declared the country ‘high risk area’ too with effect from April
2012 following increased attacks on vessels and crew members. This also has a
damaging cost implication on shipment into Nigeria and Benin waters (Oritse, 2012).
2.8.2 - Cost to Food Price Inflation
Approximately 40% of piracy attacks have been on bulk carriers and general cargo
vessels. Pirate attacks on these vessels have direct effect on the price of food staples
which bulk carriers have as deliveries of food cargo is delayed, or in the case of
perishable goods, lost (Bowden, 2010, p.22). To support this statement, Figure 12
shows the number of attacks by ship types. The most attacked ships in order of
frequency are bulk carriers, general cargo, tanker crude oil, chemical product and fishing
trawlers. Bulk carriers may be targeted probably because they have low freeboards
(short distance and the deck) (Murphy, 2010, p.46). Interestingly, there are apparently no
reported attacks on warships, probably because they are armed vessels.
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Figure 12: Attacks by Ship Types from 1991 to 2011 (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports, 20002012.)

2.8.3 - Cost of Reduced Foreign Revenue
Piracy can have significant cost on foreign revenue (Bowden, 2010) .All these pirates’
attacks and other maritime crimes have resulted in Countries of the Gulf of Guinea
losing $2 billion annually. For instance, Benin saw a 70% decrease in 2011 in the
number of ships entering its main port of Cotonou, which carries 90% of Benin’s trade,
representing 80% of the government’s budget (McNamee, 2012). Further piracy affected
Benin’s trade with landlocked States, including Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger that
depend on Cotonou port, which is one of the major transit ports servicing these
landlocked States (UNSC, 2012a).
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Similarly, Nigeria’s oil industry and ships directly targeted by Niger Delta militants
witnessed a drop in oil production by around 20% in 2006. Nigeria was losing 10% of its
daily oil output (approximately 100,000 barrels) valued at $1.5 million every day at the
time (Bowden, 2010).Due to volatility of regions affected by piracy, foreign investors
may look for alternative regions to invest their money. For instance if Ghana does not
adequately protect its waters, her tourism industry might be affected (Bowden, 2010).
2.8.4 - Cost of Naval Deterrence
The Nigeria and Benin republic joint maritime patrol is costing Benin an estimated
$466,000 US Dollars per month, which is equivalent to 5 per cent of the total cost of the
operation, of which Nigeria is bearing 95 per cent of the logistical support cost (UNSC,
2012a, p.6).
2.8. 5 - Impact on Seafarers
The cost of piracy is not purely economic (Murphy, 2010, p.54). According to IMB
reports, between 2000 and 2011, 1,214 seafarers suffered some form of violence in the
Gulf of Guinea. For instance, Benin had 140 seafarers taken hostage in 2011, which was
the second highest number in the world after Somalia. The impact of piracy on humans
cannot be quantified, because some seafarers may have varying levels of long term
distress even after violence on them (Hurlburt & Mody, 2012, p.11). Seafarers even on
large ships are apprehensive and even afraid when they pass through pirate prone areas.
Those that have suffered attacks are unwilling to return to sea (Murphy, 2010, p.54).
Fortunately, most victims are able to recover after treatment from health care
professionals (Hurlburt & Mody, 2012, p.11). Apart from the seafarers themselves, their
families and friends are even traumatized by long periods of agony, thinking of their
loved ones in captivity or even being killed. All the above experiences make the human
cost of piracy incalculable.

36

2.8.6 - Potential Environmental Impact
Piracy can cause environmental and navigational hazards as a result of violent attacks on
ships carrying liquid petroleum cargoes. During a piracy attack, a ship may be
completely taken over and the crew locked up in a central place, leaving the ship without
a helmsman to steer, and as a result end up colliding with another ship (Talley & Rule,
2008, p.93). For instance a tugboat, Lamnalco Waxbill, in the Niger Delta in Nigeria,
was attacked and the crew abducted by gunmen. The vessel was later found drifting with
a dead body onboard (Onuoha & Hassan, 2009, p. 19).
Furthermore, a spike in violence in the Niger Delta in Nigeria or attacks on super tankers
might shoot up oil prices by $10 or more per barrel. The possibilities of terrorist attacks
are there because Nigeria’s growing Liquefied Natural Gas sector large multi-billion
dollar facilities could be conspicuous new potential targets (Goldwyn & Morrison,
2005).
2.8.7 - Political Impact
Piracy can have a damaging effect on the political image of a country. A country could
be termed as weak and incapable of protecting lives and properties through its law
enforcement agencies causing embarrassment to the nation on the international scene. In
addition, the crime demoralizes the citizens and gives false sense of power to the pirates
over security agencies (Ekpeyong, 1983). The Benin government was unable to function
in the short term as a result of piracy. This situation also hampered its efforts to
consolidate democratic governance, and attract foreign investments in Benin’s oil fields
(UNSC, 2012a, p.6).
2.8.8 - Impact on Fishing
The fishing industry was greatly affected by piracy in Nigeria. It reached the point that
many captains of fishing vessels refused to put sea (Nincic, 2009).As a consequence, in
2008, over 170 Nigerian fishing vessels were idle due to the piracy risk, which
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threatened about 50,000 jobs. Nigeria lost about $600 million in export earnings due to
piracy threats to its fisheries (Bowden, 2010).
Further, prices of seafood increased astronomically as a result of the scarcity of fish,
thereby an important protein source was out of the reach of most of the average citizens
(Nincic, 2009). Nigerian pirates also caused similar piracy problems among fishermen
elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea (Nincic, 2009). In 2011, Benin was experiencing a
monthly loss of $1 million in its fishing sector (UNSC, 2012a).
2.9 - Conclusion
From the analysis of this section, piracy is encouraged by interrelated factors and causes.
The promise of reward was identified as an easy way for pirates especially Niger Delta
militants to make money. This situation is probably accentuated by high unemployment
and poverty pervading many Gulf of Guinea countries. In addition, crisis prone areas
coupled with disorder encouraged the persistence of piracy. A classic example is the
Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria. The Niger Delta geographical feature makes it even easier
for pirates to escape after attacking ships. The lack of adequate platforms of the law
enforcement agents makes it difficult to pursue them.
The high number of illicit small arms sourced from illegal oil proceeds for example
emboldened pirates to attack ships especially oil tankers, bulk carriers and fishing
vessels. These attacks have had huge impacts on prices of food commodities, shipping
costs, reduced revenue for the region and trauma on seafarers. The modus operandi of
the pirates which involve violence especially assault, hostage taking suggest the
appropriateness of the SUA Convention to repress piracy in the region. The relevance of
this section brings to fore the wider implications of not combating piracy. Hence the
next chapter looks at efforts in combating piracy and the challenges hampering these
efforts.
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Chapter 3
3 - Assessment of Current Efforts to Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Following increased piracy attacks, there have been numerous engagements at national,
bilateral, multilateral, regional and international levels to combat piracy and secure the
maritime environment of the Gulf of Guinea. This section will discuss some of the
measures in the succeeding paragraphs.
3.1 - National Measures
At the national level, for instance, the Nigerian government established in January
2012, a Joint Maritime Task Force led by army officer, known as Operation Pulo Shield,
which was transformed from Operation Restore Hope initially established to tackle
militancy in the Niger Delta .The Operation Pulo Shield is mandated to combat piracy,
armed robbery at sea and crude oil theft among other crimes (Onuoha, 2012, p10).
According to Udoh, “the Nigerian Army recently acquired some flat bottom boats to
enhance the operational effectiveness of the amphibious units in the Operation Pulo
Shield. However the Joint Task Force is challenged by the large expanse of area to patrol
coupled with the organization and sophistication of the pirates” (E.Udoh, personal
communication, September 3, 2012).
On the other hand, the Nigerian Navy hierarchy has set out a transformation programme
to acquire a new mix of warships to enhance maritime security. For instance, between
January and April 2012, the newly acquired Nigerian Navy Ship Thunder which was
deployed for intensive patrol duties arrested over seven ships with illegal consignments
(Bashir, 2012).
Further, of blessed memory, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, deceased President of
Nigeria in 2007, introduced the amnesty programme for Niger Delta Militants in 2009.
This amnesty programme drastically reduced piratical attacks in 2009 as indicated in the
IMB reports, as many of the militants responsible for piracy surrendered their arms and
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embraced the programme. According to Onuoha (2012) over 15 000 militants lay down
their arms and ammunition including about 2,760 various guns, 287, 445 ammunitions ,
18 gunboats, 763 dynamites, 1,090 dynamite caps, 3,155 magazines and other military
items ( Onuoha ,2012,p.7) .
It is instructive to note that the current President, GoodLuck Jonathan, is implementing
the amnesty programme to the letter. Hence, the recent drop of piracy in Nigerian
waters. The success of the programme changed the fortunes of oil production in Nigeria
from a low 700,000 barrels per day to the current level of 2.6million barrels per day. The
militants, who have made the waterways unsafe have all been evacuated from the creeks
and have been rehabilitated at various institutions in Nigeria and abroad. A total of 5,204
ex-militants are currently undergoing various forms of skills acquisition training, while
6,280 delegates had already been processed for deployment to local and foreign training
institutions. The rehabilitation of the militants has resulted in the creating relative peace
and security in the region (``Fast-tracking’’, 2012).
Similarly, according to Balogun, “the Nigerian Air force has signed a memorandum of
understanding with NIMASA for the aerial patrol of Nigeria waters to report real time
suspicious activities at sea. This is similar to the Eyes in the Sky initiative that was
launched to support the antipiracy efforts of Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia coordinated
Patrols in South East Asia (Storey, 2008, p.116). However political issues might arise if
the wrong persons are attacked by warplanes suspected to be carrying out illegal
activities. This is because it would be difficult to differentiate between a militant or
pirate” (N. Balogun, personal communication, September 4, 2012).
Elsewhere in Ghana, the Navy took delivery of four new patrol ships as part of efforts to
boost the naval fleet. The late President J.E.A. Mills emphasized at the commissioning
of the Ghana navy ships that “With the increasing incidents of piracy and other related
maritime crimes, we have no option than to equip our Navy to be able to guarantee a
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secure environment where all legitimate entities can operate freely without hindrance.”
(Daniel, 2012).
3.2 - Bilateral Measures
At the regional level, there are various bilateral and multilateral arrangements to tackle
piracy. The Nigerian Navy commenced a joint patrol with the Republic of Benin, code
named ‘Operation Prosperity’ led by Nigerian Navy personnel in October 2011. Three
war ships, all from Nigeria, including five support vessels, two defender boats and
helicopters are involved in the exercise (Usman, 2011). This was an initiative of the
Presidents of Nigeria and Benin. According to Dieng, “the maritime operation is a
political arrangement not a legal one” (A. Dieng, personal communication, September 4,
2012). Therefore there is the need enhance the legal aspects especially in the prosecution
of piracy suspects.
An IMO/Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)Forum in
October 2006, agreed to the establishment of an integrated coast guard function network
for West and Central African countries which among other things agreed to cooperate in
several areas such as combating piracy, armed robbery against ships and other maritime
crimes (Addico,2008) . According to Diop, “apart from Nigeria, Cape Verde and Cote d
´Ivoire, the implementation of the sub regional coast guard network in other states is
fraught with challenges. These include poor legislative framework, poor institutional
arrangements, lack of funding and inadequate skilled human resources” (A. Diop,
personal communication, October 14, 2012).
In addition, in response to UNSC Resolution 2018 on the need for an anti-piracy strategy
and regional cooperation, ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African
States

(ECCAS) during their meeting in Benin from 26-29 March 2012 signed a

memorandum of understanding in Benin to combat piracy, robbery at sea and other
illicit activities in the region ( Chuter ,2012).
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According to Dieng, “following the recorded success of Nigerian Navy/ Benin
Operation Prosperity, ECOWAS held a workshop from 28-29 August 2012 to draft a
multilateral agreement for the establishment of a proposed Zone that would comprise
Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Togo of the maritime region of West Africa to suppress illicit
Maritime activities. It is instructive to note that Niger, a landlocked country is part of
Zone E because of her heavy dependence on the Benin ports for importation of goods
and commodities. The Zone E arrangement is a replication of the commendable efforts
of the maritime patrols zoning system (A, C and D) of ECCAS” (A. Dieng, personal
communication, September 4, 2012).
Albeit, ECCAS member States relatively comprehensive collective anti-piracy
architecture over the past three years, their efforts were still limited in scope and
effectiveness as individual Central African States were finding it increasingly difficult to
continue to finance and support naval operations on their own (UNSC , 2012a).
However, the collaboration between ECCAS and ECOWAS to combat piracy is a
prospect for enhanced cooperation.
3.3 - Multilateral Measures
In 2005, US introduced its National Strategy for Maritime Security which included
plans to improve maritime capacities of African coastal states. In 2007, the US
established Africa Command (AFRICOM) and in conjunction with United States Navy
has been conducting several activities through its Global Fleet Concept in African
Partnership Station (APS) to build capacities of African navies to enforce maritime laws
(Ploch, 2011,p.16).The APS conducts joint exercises, port visits and practical
professional training with the coastal nations( Ezeobi, 2012).In terms of funding, the
U.S has provided 35 million dollars, since 2007 to regional states to build maritime
security capacity such as coastal radars, equipment, boats, and associated training. The
latter resulted in developing the first multi-national maritime exercise in the Gulf of
Guinea, the Obangame Express 2012, over a two-day period (Galamas & Bilala, 2012).
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3.4 - The United Nations Response
Given the Gulf of Guinea’s relative economic importance (Nelson & Ware, 2012), and
seriousness of the threat the UN sent an assessment mission to West Africa to evaluate
the situation (Rhinehard, 2012). In addition ,United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
adopted UNSC resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012), expressing concern about the
threat posed by piracy and armed robbery to international navigation and called for
interagency and littoral states (UNSC,2011;UNSC,2012c). To that end, the UN
specifically advocated for a regional conference in concert with the African Union to
elaborate on a regional strategy to fight piracy (Philips, 2012).
3.5 - Challenges hampering efforts in combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Before discussing the strategies to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea sub region, it is
necessary to look at some of the challenges that could be obstacles to cooperation in the
region. This necessity is based on historical antecedents. According to Fajriyansah
(2007) conducting a war against piracy is a heavy and complicated task. Many problems
and challenges must be faced by the states and international organizations because every
year the piracy number of attacks remains high (Fajriyansah, 2007, p.121). Giving
credence to this statement, Bateman (2005) ,stated that the proposal for a Regional
Maritime Surveillance and Safety Regime for Southeast Asian waters suggested by the
Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia was marred by several
difficulties such as lack of clear interest between possible member states, regional
sensitivities to particular issues including fishing and disputed maritime claims
(Bateman, 2005,p.261).It is on this premise that this

section looks at challenges

hampering the efforts to tackle piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
These challenges inter alia are lack of political will, poor maritime domain awareness
and maritime border disputes. Others include poor technological base, inadequate
interagency cooperation, inadequate capacity of navies and coast guards, increasing
influence of extra regional powers and weak legal framework.
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3.5.1 - Lack of Political Will
In many developing countries, the political will to adequately fund naval assets
acquisition and maritime operations is lacking (Usoro, 2012). Often most of the region’s
policy makers and politicians lack the understanding of the importance of maritime
security. As a result, maritime strategy, a very strong concept to ensure the adequate
safety and protection of the maritime environment is relegated to the background
(Quashie, 2010) .According to Dieng,” most states in West Africa do not have a national
maritime strategy”. The maritime strategy project is often seen as an unproductive
exercise (Quashie, 2010).There is no gainsaying that an “unwavering political will is
critical to any successful strategy is lacking due to vestiges of a land centric approach”
(Gilpin, 2007). Apart from the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the
1990s, no large peacekeeping operation within Africa had involved naval forces (
Ibrahim, 2009).However, there is still much to be done to educate policy makers on the
derivable benefits from a well-protected maritime environment (Quashie,2010). If not
adequately addressed, the lack of political will can militate against the establishment of a
strategy to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
3.5.2 - Maritime Border Disputes
The primary obstacle that hinders interstate cooperation anywhere is concern over
sovereignty (Murphy, 2010, p.82).Where claims of two or more coastal states intersect
for reasons of territorial, contiguous , Exclusive Economic Zone or continental shelf
delimitation, complex issues or disputes are often raised (Cozens, 2005 ,p.116). This
restraint is reinforced by a certain lack of political commitment to many cooperative
activities and can be manifested also in the failure to implement or comply with
international instruments (Bateman, 2001). Examples of maritime disputes in the Gulf of
Guinea include those between: Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the
mouth of the Ntem River; and Gabon and Equatorial Guinea over the Mbane Island and
Corisco Bay boundaries (Gilpin, 2007). On the other hand, recently, there have been
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calls for the Nigerian government to appeal the International Court of Justice judgment
of 2002 in the land and maritime boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria
ceding the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. To ensure a peaceful coexistence with
Cameroon, the Nigerian government decided not to pursue the review of the case
(Ibegwam, 2012). This act by the Nigerian government indicates prospects for enhanced
cooperation in the region. In contrast, if maritime disputes are not properly resolved
certain states might take actions based on self-interest and jeopardize any effort to
enhance maritime security.
3.5.3 - Inadequate Inter –Agency Cooperation
Conflicting and duplicity of national polices and legislation in many African states has
been a challenge to regional cooperation in maritime issues. Often times there are two
regional organizations with similar mandates which operate in the same area without any
tangible effort to harmonize their operations (Wambua, 2009). In addition, the collective
efforts being carried out by various countries and regional organizations could be
counterproductive despite the successes gained and militate against the enhancement of
maritime security in the region (Galamas & Bilala, 2012). For instance with 23 diverse
countries across the region, achieving consensus strategies on fighting maritime piracy
has been difficult. A classic case is the several maritime initiatives undertaken by several
regional organizations. For example, the Central African States recently set up a
Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa to enhance information sharing:
in West Africa, member States of the ECCAS and ECOWAS established their own
maritime security efforts. Another cooperative effort involves the Gulf of Guinea
Commission (GGC) and the MOWCA, who set up their respective plans and
memoranda of understanding. With so many concurrent efforts, it could result into
duplication of efforts and a regional rivalry may emanate if not properly coordinated
(Galamas & Bilala, 2012).
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3.5.4 - Poor Maritime Domain Awareness
In the words of Admiral Gary Roughead``Maritime Domain Awareness is where it all
begins. We cannot conduct the operations that we must if we don’t have a good sense of
what’s out there, moving on, above or under the sea.’’(Boraz, 2009, p.136)
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) involves generating actionable intelligence to
effectively conduct various maritime tasks, counter terrorism and maritime law
enforcement operations (Akpan, 2010, p.45). From the foregoing, actionable intelligence
is the single most important prerequisite for interdicting illicit traffic at sea (Quashie,
2010). As stated earlier, the traditional land centric approach to security has contributed
to a systemic neglect of maritime forces. In addition, many citizens of Africa do not
comprehend and have not seen the sea (Fouché, 2010b). Basic equipment for
surveillance, patrol boats and trained personnel are inadequate. This situation is a
militating factor in combating piracy in the sub region (Alege, 2010). In order to address
security issues, situational awareness of the maritime domain is critical as it would
provide the necessary information to African leaders to make informed decisions that
would enhance maritime security (Ibrahim, 2009).
According to Okae, “the maritime component of the ECOWAS Standby Military Force
is the least developed to further lend credence to poor maritime domain awareness in the
region” (C. Okae, September 4, 2012). This lack of maritime domain awareness remains
an issue a matter acknowledged by two speakers from West Africa at the 2009 Sea
Power for Africa Symposium in Cape Town (Vrey,2009, p.26). Poor maritime domain
awareness can seriously hamper efforts to combat maritime crimes in the Gulf of
Guinea.
3.5.5 - Inadequate Capacity of Navies and Coast Guards
Many regional countries lack the capacity to take part on the same plane in any
cooperative endeavor (Bateman, 2001). The status of most African navies is an obstacle
to effective regional cooperation in the governance of African ocean areas (Wambua,
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2009). Many African countries, moreover, have prioritized investment in land-based
forces over maritime units (Vogel, 2011).According to Admiral Ola Saad Ibrahim, an
assessment of Africa’s naval/coast guard capabilities reveal most of them cannot
adequately enforce laws in their respective maritime zones (Ibrahim, 2009) See Table 3.
Table 3: Naval Capabilities of Some Gulf of Guinea Countries.

Navy/Coast
Guard

GDP in
billions-US
dollars/ in
2009

Personnel
Serial

Countries

Defence
Budget 2009

2.77billion(bn)
1.

Angola

1,000

77.7

2.

Benin

200

7.2bn

3.

Cameroon

1,300

24.1bn

4.

Cape Verde

100

5.

Congo

800

11.6bn

6.

Côte d’Ivoire

900

24.4bn

7

Senegal

950

13.5bn

8.

Democratic
Republic
Congo

9.

Gabon

500

10.

The Gambia

70

11.

Ghana

2,000

12

Togo

200

13

Guinea
Bissau

350

14.

Guinea

400

15

Nigeria

Platforms

US dollars

79million(m)

Patrol and Coastal
Combatants(PCC)-9
Submarine-1
PCC- 2
PCC-11
Amphibious-2
PCC -3
PCC-3 with several river
boats

360m

6,703

PCC-3
12.2bn

PCC-9
189m

PCC-3

15billion

264m

PCC-7

3bn

67m
20m
55m

8,000

PCC- 3
Amphibious-2

135bn

1.49bn

PCC-2
PCC-2
Principal Surface Frigates-2,
PCC-27, Minewarfare-2,
Amphibious-1, Logistics and
Support vessels-5

Source: The Military balance, 2010.
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Navies are not thought to be as necessary as the other branches of the armed forces and
are often considered last in budgetary allocations. The high cost of naval equipment
worsens the situation (Wambua, 2009). For instance the estimated cost of acquiring new
ships for the Nigeria Navy in United States dollars are as follows; “General Purpose
Frigate-$350million, Long Endurance Offshore Patrol Vessel-$120million, Landing
Platform-$350million,

Medium

Submarine-$300million

and

Endurance
Landing

Offshore

Ship

Patrol

Tank-$90million

Vessel-$60million,
among

others

“(Omonobi,2012). Based on the Gross Domestic Product of the Gulf of Guinea
Countries and the defence spending in Table 3, it might be a big burden to acquire these
relatively expensive platforms to patrol the 6000 kilometer stretch of the Gulf of Guinea.
Another challenge is the strength of naval personnel in some the countries. Apart from
Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ghana with 8000, 6703, 2000 personnel
respectively, the other countries are somewhat inadequate in personnel. According to the
confession of the alleged leader of the hijack of MT Energy Centurion, there are about
1,250 trained pirates in Nigeria (Bilesanmi& Amata, 2012). In military analysis this
number of pirates could match the firepower of some of the weak navies put together.
According to Ogbor, “adequate manpower and warships that would be able to sustain
patrols in a country´s maritime zone is an effective strategy to combat piracy” (E.Ogbor,
personal communication, September 3, 2012). Based on the foregoing, inadequate
capacity of navies and coast guards in the Gulf of Guinea is a challenge to combat
piracy.
3.5.6 - Weak Legal Framework
The provisions of international law governing piracy are relatively clear, and there are
no significant problems of jurisdiction (Guilfoyle, 2011). The legal obstacles in
combating piracy for states occur in implementation of international conventions due to
weak navies or inadequate domestic criminal laws (Kraska, 2011b). In Resolution 1918
(2010), for instance, the UN Security Council noted that the domestic criminal laws of a
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number of states lack provisions criminalizing piracy, or are deficient in criminal
procedural rules needed to effectively prosecute pirates (Kraska,2011b).
Cooperation is also hindered because many regional states do not have extradition
agreements in place (Bateman, 2001).There are other complexities involved in
cooperation between national systems which could militate against combating piracy
(Guilfoyle ,2011). A classic example of a complexity is:
If a Somali pirate is apprehended by a United Kingdom warship, prosecuted in
the Seychelles and then transferred to a third state to serve his sentence, a chain
of legal relationships is involved. One of the basic difficulties involved in this
type of chain, involves how to gather evidence if a capturing warship does not
know in advance which state will agree to prosecute suspect pirates. Moreover,
some states may also find it legally difficult to transfer suspects to partner states
for prosecution without human rights guarantees. (Guilfoyle, 2011, p.96).
As a consequence, more than half of suspected pirates in Somali waters deprived of their
freedom up to December 4, 2009, were released without being prosecuted( Fouché,
2010b).States also face a lack of political will and resources required to conduct
expensive criminal trials and to imprison convicted pirates for long periods of time
(Kraska,2011b).This dilemma might arise in the Gulf of Guinea if and when full antipiracy operations involving many of the states within the sub-region take off. Currently
in the Gulf of Guinea states, the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention has not yet
been implemented and as far as piracy is concerned and there is no regional arrangement
for hot pursuit across national maritime boundaries( Vrey, 2009,p.25).
According to Mike Ibokwe, a lawyer and IMO Consultant in Nigeria, the current
legislation with respect to trying pirates in Nigeria is inadequate. However, Nigeria is a
signatory to the UNCLOS 1982 and SUA Convention and 2005 protocols, but these
laws are yet to be domesticated. The current municipal law for trying piracy is the
criminal code of 1906, which is not comprehensive (Ozoeze, 2011). This kind of piracy
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law was drafted for piracy of a different kind from a different age, and these laws are not
easily applied to the modern brand of piracy practiced (Cole, 2011). According to
Ibokwe, the current situation now is that if the Nigerian Navy arrests pirates or armed
robbers at sea, they would not be able to be prosecuted in Nigerian courts on the basis of
the treaty that Nigeria has signed concerning SUA or the protocols to these treaties. So,
it is only by domesticating these Conventions, of which the process is ongoing, that
Nigeria can be on the same page with the international standards and treaty obligation
(Ozoeze, 2011).
A similar situation exists in Benin. Benin is a signatory to a both UNCLOS and SUA
Conventions. However, the UN Assessment mission to Benin revealed that the country’s
legal framework needs to be reformed to effectively address the threat of piracy. First,
the definition of the crime of piracy is outdated and is not consistent with the definition
of piracy under the UNCLOS (UNSC, 2012a). For example, in two recent piracy cases
reported by the Benin authorities, suspected pirates were charged with generic offences,
such as armed robbery, premeditated murder and conspiracy (UNSC, 2012a).Unless
other modes of liability, such as conspiracy, are not criminalized, the potential for
combating piracy and other forms of organized crime will remain extremely limited. In
addition, the universal jurisdiction provided for under the Convention with respect to the
arrest and the prosecution of pirates is not incorporated in Benin’s Maritime Code. As a
result, Benin’s jurisdiction on piracy acts committed on the high seas is limited to acts
committed by its citizens or on board of Beninese ships. Moreover, while the national
Maritime Code contains rules for the investigation of offences committed at sea by
various national authorities and the handling of suspects arrested at sea, it needs to be
updated and streamlined (UNSC, 2012a).
The ultimate obstacle to more piracy prosecutions is political will as finding states
willing to detain convicted pirates, is difficult, as this entails a much larger cost than
prosecution outside the territorial sea (Guilfoyle, 2011). According to Ukonga of the
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Gulf of Guinea Commission the inadequate legal framework for dealing with piracy in
the region, is causing the release of piracy suspects. There is an urgent need to have a
common definition of piracy, with the same type of punishment and a neutral
jurisdiction to try piracy suspects (UNSC,2012b).The issue of weak legal framework if
not adequately addressed can militate against the implementation of a strategy to combat
piracy.
3.5.7 - Poor Technological Base
Most African governments lack technological expertise and institutions for repair and
maintenance of platforms and equipment. In addition, international partners donate or
sell security equipment to Africa with only basic training in operation and repair.
Critically absent is support for locally-driven technological adaptation (Vogel, 2011).
This low technological base is an issue hindering development efforts in Third World
countries. For instance Nigeria acquired warships with advanced technologies that
require high cost of maintenance, where the local technology could not support. Further,
the dockyard repair facilities and surveillance systems are capital intensive and cannot
be supported by the funding of the Nigerian Navy. As previously explained this low
technological base greatly affected the operational and patrolling capability of most
Nigerian Navy ships and thus led to increased piracy attacks especially in 2003. From
the foregoing low technological base could pose a challenge to enhance maritime
security (Usoro, 2012, p.63). Despite, the poor technological challenge, Nigerian Navy
was able to build a Seaward Defence Boat with high local resources (Stephen, 2012).
This feat attained can be sustained if more funds are appropriated to the Nigerian Navy
for research and development.
3.5.8 - Increasing influence of extra-regional powers in Africa
The United States increased its influence and presence in the Gulf of Guinea by the
establishment of AFRICOM (Ibrahim, 2009). On the other hand, the presence of
Chinese warships in Somalia waters is a subtle way to expand its military influence in
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Africa (Murphy, 2012). Until the crisis in the Niger Delta, US purchased almost
1.1million barrels per day of Nigeria’s oil (Mane, 2005). In January 2006, Nigeria
extended licenses to China for a commitment to invest $4.4 billion in refining and power
generation, giving Chinese companies a 45 percent stake in new oil fields (Rougheen,
2007). Again, Angola exports about 2 million barrels of oil per day with 25 percent
going to the US and 25 percent to China. Also China provided $2 billion in loans and
aid to Angola (Osaretin, 2011).From the foregoing China wants to use its new found
power to influence or alter the international system to suit its own worldview (Murphy,
2012). For instance China’s investment in Sudan limited the ability of the UN Security
Council to utilize Chapter VII sanctions to address the conflict in Darfur (Goldwyn &
Morrison, 2005). Therefore one of the major roles of AFRICOM in the Gulf of Guinea
is to checkmate the rising influence of China in Africa (Onuoha, 2008). There have been
mixed reactions as to the implications of AFRICOM on African soil. While some
countries like Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone had accepted, and even offered their domain
for AFRICOM, Nigeria has been opposed to the basing of the Command on African soil
(Onuoha, 2008).
Coupled with the rising influence is the competition for influence between regional
powers. China as a global power has access to any leader in the region. African leaders
can now turn to the East for financial and political support. Competition for influence
with the region’s leaders can be a serious obstacle to any cooperative agreement
(Goldwyn & Morrison, 2005). This rising influence presents a challenge to African
nations to forge a common front (Ibrahim, 2009). Based on the foregoing, and especially
current events in the Syria crisis, it is clear that when two opposing global powers with
interests in a certain place are impinged, it could militate against any cooperative
regime.
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter identified numerous efforts by national and extra regional governments, as
well as international organizations to address the problem of piracy. It was observed that
that some processes had been ongoing for many years, while some were just recent in
2012. Despite all these measures, piracy has not abated. Apart from factors that
encourage piracy as discussed earlier, there were identified challenges which could be
obstacles to cooperation to combat piracy. It was identified that a major challenge was
lack of political will as a result of poor maritime culture and marine domain awareness.
Others were legal barriers and inadequate capacity of navies. With regards to the size of
the Gulf of Guinea it would be difficult for the current platforms available to fight
piracy. Therefore it is important to devise a comprehensive strategy to mitigate the
challenges in countering piracy. The next chapter seeks to address that.
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Chapter 4
4. - Integrated Maritime Security Strategy to mitigate the Challenges hampering
Efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
The challenges hampering efforts in combating piracy and armed robbery at sea in the
Gulf of Guinea can be only be addressed by a combination of measures such as
enhancement of political will, improved maritime domain awareness and provision of
adequate fleet maintenance facilities. Others are heightened public awareness and
regional cooperation. Arguably, however the most urgent of these is regional
cooperation. Because piracy is a Trans -boundary issue, the cooperation of all affected
states is crucial to controlling the menace. According to Vice Admiral Hideaki Kaneda
“Maritime Safety and Security cannot be achieved through the efforts of a single
country. Only the mutual understanding and cooperation of regional countries can fulfill
it” (Kaneda, 2005, p.51).
4.1 - Regional Cooperation
We have seen regional cooperation in varying levels in the two areas most affected by
piracy-Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. In spite of the unique situations in these
regions, lessons learnt from them could be applicable in the Gulf of Guinea. Koji
Sekimizu, IMO Secretary General, when Director of the Maritime Safety Division,
stated an African ReCAAP could play an active role in reducing piracy, which has
assumed dangerous proportions in Nigeria and Somalia…(Menefee,2010,p.198).
The UN and IMO are the foremost organizations in the world in constant pursuit of
relative peace and safety in the world’s maritime environment. To this end, these
organizations have regularly issued resolutions identifying cooperation especially
regional cooperation as a sine qua non for suppression of piracy. In furtherance of this,
the UN General Assembly in Resolution 63/111 of 12, February 2009 dealing with
Oceans and Law of the Sea, Para 61, recognized the crucial role of international
cooperation at the global, regional, sub regional and bilateral levels in combating, in
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accordance with international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy, armed
robbery at sea, through bilateral and multilateral instruments and mechanisms (Geiss &
Petrig, 2011, p.44).
In a similar vein, the IMO has through the Code of Practice for Investigation of the
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Ships ``invited all Governments to develop, as
appropriate, agreements and procedures to facilitate cooperation in applying efficient
and effective measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships’’(IMO,
2010). In tandem with UN Security resolution 2018 and IMO/MOWCA efforts in
establishing a regional integrated coast guard for the Gulf of Guinea, it would be
apposite to look at existing main arrangements to counter piracy which are ReCAAP and
DCoC.
The ReCAAP was one of the countermeasures set up to combat piracy in the Strait of
Malacca. The other measures include a sea patrol initiative and a joint air patrol called
Eyes in the Sky (EiS) (Ng, 2011, p.1). In 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
initiated coordinated maritime patrols, called MALSINDO to address crime in the
Malacca Straits (Farley & Gortzak, 2009). The Maritime Security Patrol was
coordinated rather than joint each country responsible for patrolling its own waters
(Storey, 2008, p.119). In 2005, the EiS initiative was launched and was intended to
achieve maritime domain awareness while the naval patrols were to physically secure
and defend that domain (Ong & Ho, 2005). These countermeasures successfully reduced
the number of pirate attacks, with only 2 incidents reported in 2009 (Ng, 2011, p.1).
Based on the success, the IMO meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore held in
Malaysia in September 2006 and the 60th session of the UN General Assembly
welcomed the advances the regional cooperation brought about by ReCAAP (Kraska,
2011a, p.145).As a consequence, the IMO sponsored a similar model of a regional
agreement in the Horn of Africa to implement anti-piracy measures. This initiative gave
birth to the Djibouti Code of Conduct (Kraska, 2011, p.147).

55

4.2 - Background to ReCAAP
The ReCAAP Convention had its acknowledged origins in the Tokyo Appeal of March
2000 and the Asia Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000 and the Tokyo Model Action Plan of
April (Menefee, 2010, p.188). The Tokyo Appeal makes reference to a set of
recommendations developed by the IMO, that inter alia, call for ``further development
of regional cooperation’’ and ``a regional agreement to facilitate coordinated response at
the tactical as well as the operational level’’ to be concluded between the countries
concerned’’ (Mejia, 2010b). ReCAAP is the first regional government-to-government
agreement and it was finalized on 11 November 2004 and entered into force on 4
September 2006. To date, 18 States have become Contracting Parties to ReCAAP. The
Contracting Parties are Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Netherlands,
Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom and Viet Nam
(ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, 2011).The Agreement called for the setting up of
an Information Sharing Centre (ISC), which was launched 29 November 2006 in
Singapore (Ho, 2008). ReCAAP establishes a framework for cooperation among the
member states on three main aspects; information sharing, capacity

building and

operational cooperation (Storey, 2008, p114). It is pertinent to note that Malaysia and
Indonesia, two important countries in the region are not contracting parties to ReCAAP
(Mejia, 2010b).
4.2.1- Major Features of ReCAAP
Article 1 of the Agreement takes verbatim the definition of piracy in UNCLOS Article
101 and armed robbery against ships as contained in Annex to Resolution A.922(22) of
the IMO.This could be due to several issues including locational, two ship requirement
surrounding the definitions of`` piracy and armed robbery against ships’’.
Article 3 deals with General Obligations wherein contracting parties are required to take
all effective measures in accordance with national and international laws to prevent and
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suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships, arrest pirates and armed robbery
suspects, seize ships taken by or under the control of pirates and rescue victims of piracy
and armed robbery against ships.
Article 4 is one of the pillars of the agreement. It deals with the establishment of the
Information Sharing Center, located in Singapore. With a staff of thirteen to fifteen
representing the member states, it has the status of an international organization as found
in Article 5 and designed to enhance communication and information on incidents of
piracy and armed robbery in the region (Menefee, 2010). The center is composed of a
Governing Council and a Secretariat.
Article 6 provides for the funding of the ISC from host states, voluntary contributions
from contracting parties and international organizations. It is important to note that
inadequate funding can be a major setback for any organizational outfit, hence the need
for the proper funding of the Center.
Article 9 requires each contracting party to designate a focal point responsible for
communication with the Center. The focal point is the nexus for smooth and effective
communication with other national authorities. All contracting parties are required to
notify focal points of incidents of piracy or armed robbery against ships.
Article 12 obliges contracting parties, subject to its national laws, shall endeavor to
extradite pirates or armed robbery suspects, present in its territory, to the other
Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over them, at the request of that Contracting
Party. This article is worded in a rather cautious language. It does not provide for a strict
obligation to prosecute or extradite piracy suspects (Geiss & Petrig, 2011, p.46) .This is
a limitation, considering the tendency of pirates to evade arrest by seeking refuge in a
state with weak legislation on piracy. Article 13 provides for Contracting states to render
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, including submission of evidence related to
piracy and armed robbery against ships. This aspect is particularly important due to
prosecutorial challenges that might arise as a result of want of evidence to try pirates.
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Article 14 deals with Capacity Building one of the pillars of the Agreement. The
Agreement obliges Contracting Parties to the fullest possible extent endeavor to
cooperate or provide capacity building assistance which may include educational and
training programmes to share experiences and best practices.
Article 15 deals with cooperative arrangements such as joint exercises, or other forms of
cooperation. Article 17 provides for settlement of disputes which might arise as a result
of interpretation or application of the Agreement through negotiations in accordance
with international laws.
4.2.2 - Lessons Learned from ReCAAP
Designation of Focal Points
The designation of a focal point by each contracting party for the ISC is considered one
of the strengths of ReCAAP. A Contracting Party not in the habit of inter-agency
coordination would have to look at one its numerous organizations for dealing with
piracy and armed robbery and also identify the inter-agency processes associated with it
(Ho, 2008). This aspect is particularly important for the Gulf of Guinea where there are
numerous agencies involved in maritime security issues and the duplication of effort as
previously mentioned. Hence a focal point for armed robbery and piracy reports could
enhance information sharing amongst agencies.
Capacity Building Programme
The capacity building programme has been identified as one of the strength of ReCAAP.
Technical assistance, exercises, training workshops and sharing of best practices
inculcates a great awareness among contracting parties (Ho, 2008). This is an
opportunity for better resourced and funded parties to assist less funded parties to
achieve the common goal of suppressing piracy and armed robbery and vice versa in
terms of sharing experiences and best practices.
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Cooperative Arrangements
ReCAAP is an inclusive organization. Piracy and armed robbery affects both
governments and the shipping industry alike. The Agreement shares information and
cooperates with all stakeholders such as IMO, Baltic and International Maritime Council
(BIMCO), Asian Shipowners´ Forum (ASF) and International Independent Tanker
Owners´ Organization (INTERTANKO) that have knowledge and the capacity to deal
with piracy issues. ReCAAP also allows accession by any state outside the Asian region,
which allows the organization to grow (Ho, 2008). A Regional Agreement can serve as
vehicle to receive assistance. While external assistance can be vital, a regional
organization can ensure the efficient use of resources among member states, negating the
impression that measures and programmes are imposed by extra –regional forces (Mejia,
2010b).Piracy is a global phenomenon (Murphy, 2010) hence, it would be desirable for
affected and interested parties to join and give support for the fight against piracy. This
area is particularly necessary in the area of acquisition of ships for weak navies and
technical support for the Gulf of Guinea countries.
Challenges of ReCAAP
There is no gainsaying that when many nations are involved in a project there is bound
to be some challenges. The fact that Malaysia and Indonesia are not parties to ReCAAP
is a big challenge for the Agreement. Most of the piratical attacks occurred in these
countries and they were critical in the reduction of piracy in the region (Mejia, 2010b).
ReCAAP has been working hard to cover this gap by working with the relevant
maritime agencies in Malaysia and Indonesia (Ho, 2008).
Another challenge facing ReCAAP is the delay in receiving reports from focal points,
which could undermine operations of the Center. To remedy this situation, the shipping
industry and ships are encouraged to report directly to the ISC, to improve timeliness of
reports and facilitate response to incidents (Ho, 2008). If and when an ISC is established
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in the Gulf of Guinea, reports from all shipping related agencies could be collated and
processed to ensure quick response to piracy attacks.
Similar to delay in filing reports, is the challenge of underreporting which ISCs will
encounter. Most ships are reluctant to report attacks due to fear of prolonged
investigations and unnecessary delays. The collation and analysis of data is important in
the fight against maritime crimes (Mejia, 2010b). This is where ship-owners and
maritime stakeholders have to work seriously to cover the information sharing gap. One
of the areas that could be improved upon, if ReCAAP is adapted to another region is the
issue of capacity building in areas of extradition and mutual legal assistance (Mejia,
2010b).
A big challenge to any organization is the issue of funding. Despite the successes
recorded by ReCAAP the challenge of finances rears its ugly head. Only less than half
of the members contribute to the organization coffers (Mejia, 2010b). Menefee (2010)
noted “that this cannot be considered a healthy situation in an organization which is
supposed to be run on consensus and should be rectified as soon as possible. Otherwise,
it is hard to believe that countries footing the bill will not eventually develop an
unhealthy, if understandable, a sense of entitlement concerning ReCAAP ISC and its
operations “(Menefee, 2010, p.191).
Based on the foregoing, even though ReCAAP has its shortcomings evident of any
human endeavor, its strengths of information sharing, capacity building and cooperative
arrangements are tested and tried ventures that could be replicated in pirate hotspots like
the Gulf of Guinea.
4.3 - Background to DCoC
The DCoC was signed on 29 January 2009 by representatives of Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania
and Yemen. With the signing by South Africa on 15 May, the number of signatures was
brought to 19 States out of the 21 eligible to sign. The 19 signatory States are: the
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Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives,
Mauritius, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, the Sudan, the
United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen (IMO, 2012). In
addition to the DCoC, various international taskforces to combat piracy were established
as a response to threat to international shipping in the Horn of Africa. One of the
taskforces was the Combined Maritime Forces led by the United States (Geiss & Petrig,
2011, p25). In addition, the European Union (EU) in 2008, created the EU Naval Force
Somalia (NAVFOR ATALANTA), to protect ships from the World Food Programme
(WFP) (Maouche, 2010, p.6). Another taskforce was initiated by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), Operation Allied Provider in October 2008 to escort
World Food Programme ships delivering supplies to Somalia (Tutu, 2011, p.12). In
2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 1816 and 1851
authorizing countries to enter Somali territorial waters and use all necessary means to
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea and on land as well in a manner
consistent with the provision of international law with consent with Somalia’s interim
government (Ho, 2009).
4.3.1- Principal Features of DCoC
To effectively fight the scourge of piracy in the Horn of Africa, Article 1 of the Code
adopts both the UNCLOS and IMO definitions of piracy and armed robbery against
ships.
Measures to Repress Piracy are contained in Annex 4. Paragraph 7 provides for a
participant which carries out a seizure, may, ``subject to its national laws and in
consultation with other interested entities, waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction
and authorize any other Participant to enforce its laws against the ship and /or persons
onboard’’. In addition, it obliges any seizure made in the territorial sea of a Participant
should be subject to the jurisdiction of that Participant. Paragraph 5, states no
“Participant should pursue a ship in or over the territory or territorial sea of any coastal
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state without the permission of that State”. This goes to show respect for the territorial
integrity of a participating state.
Article 7 of the Code deals with Embarked officers. This is a distinct part of the Code
that ReCAAP does not have. The Code provides for armed officers to embark in the
patrol ships or aircraft of another Participant. It further states that, the ``embarked
officers may assist the host Participant and conduct operations from the host Participant
ship or aircraft if expressly requested to do so by the host Participant, and only in the
manner requested’’. According to Wambua (2010), this provision is aimed at facilitating
the subsequent exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by the national courts of the state of
the embarked officials (Wambua, 2010, p.10). Based upon this provision the ongoing
anti-piracy operation of Nigerian and Benin is a good opportunity to assess the
practicalities of the embarkation of officers from Benin republic onboard Nigerian
vessels with a view to improving upon the concept.
The Code also has similar provisions with ReCAAP Article 3 of the Code with regards
to protection measures for ships taken after Article 16 of ReCAAP. In the same vein,
Articles 8,9,10 of the Code concerning coordination and information sharing, incident
reporting and general assistance among participants resemble Articles 9 and 10 of
ReCAAP. To ensure coordinated, smooth and effective communications between focal
points, the Code makes provisions for 3 ISCs in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. Article 9
intends to provide for Participants the “development of uniform reporting criteria in
order to ensure an accurate assessment of the threat of piracy and armed robbery in the
Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden”.
One of the pillars of the Code is Article 11 regarding Review of National Legislation. It
is thus extracted from the DCoC:
In order to allow for the prosecution, conviction and punishment of those
involved in piracy or armed robbery against ships, and to facilitate extradition or
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handing over when prosecution is not possible, each Participant intends to review
its national legislation with a view towards ensuring that there are national laws
in place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery against ships, and adequate
guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations, and
prosecutions of alleged offenders.
The purpose of this Article is to ensure that persons arrested for piracy and armed
robbery against ships do not evade prosecution.
Article 12 of the Code obligates Parties to settle disputes by consultation and peaceful
means.The Code is dissimilar to ReCAAP in the sense that it is not binding. Article
(15a) states:
Nothing in this Code is intended to create a binding agreement, except as noted
in Article 13, which states that within two years of the effective date of the Code,
and having designated the national focal points to in Article 8, the participants
intend to consult with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement.
This aspect of a non-binding agreement where the framers adopted the term Code of
Conduct rather than treaty, convention, or agreement reflects a major weakness of the
Code (Wambua, 2010, p.9). Unlike the ReCAAP, DCoC is not open for accession by
any state (Geiss & Petrig, 2011, p.50).
Resolution 3 provides for Enhancing Training in the region for officials designated by
Governments. To that effect, a training centre was established in Djibouti to ensure the
wide, effective and uniform implementation of the provisions of the Code.
4.3.2 - Lessons learned from DCoC
Achievements of the DCoC
Geiss and Petrig (2011) suggested that the Code has “been praised as a milestone
development a central instrument in the development of regional capacity” (Geiss &
Petrig, 2011). In the area of national legislation to meet international standards, 12 of the
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member states have introduced changes to their laws (Bueger & Saran, 2012). This is a
clear sign of progress in the fight against piracy.
Furthermore, Inter agency cooperation improved amongst the navies, coastguards and
marine police as a result of training and capacity building on legal issues by United
Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC). The resultant effect was arrest of more
criminals into the national legal systems (Bueger & Saran, 2012).
A fund named Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund was established in 2009 for the
administration of the agreement. Many countries and international organizations
including UN and IMO member states, private individuals have contributed over 14
million US dollars to the process (Bueger & Saran, 2012).
The DCoC ISCs and ReCAAP established

Standard Operating Procedures for

exchange of information on piracy related matters. This is considered a major
achievement for collaboration between Asia and Africa to enhance the Western Indian
Ocean anti – piracy framework (Bueger & Saran, 2012). Based on the above
achievements it can be seen that there is appreciable progress in training, information
sharing and capacity building.
Challenges of DCoC
There is difficulty in fostering security cooperation by the participating states in terms of
joint multilateral operations or collective responses. This is evident in the lack of
consensus by the states to have one ISC, like ReCAAP (Bueger & Saran, 2012).
According to Mejia, the establishment of 3 ISCs makes for a potentially cumbersome
arrangement (Mejia, 2010b).
Excluding two major coastal states that are regional powerhouses, Pakistan and India is
a major challenge for the Code. The anti-piracy fight is concentrated on Africa and not
on the Western Indian Ocean region. These countries can provide capacity and
leadership. Both states are at the forefront of counter-piracy efforts, given the extension

64

of the operational terrain of piracy groups (Bueger & Saran, 2012). Moreover, the
political dimension of the region is a challenge that cannot be overlooked. ReCAAP is
made up of and has the support of vibrant economies and strong governments in Asia.
The littoral states of the Strait of Malacca are much wealthier, their GDP level are 10
times more than the littoral states in the Somalia region (Mejia, 2010b,:
Ng,2011,p.11).The case of Somalia is the opposite. Somalia has been plagued by piracy
and it is topping the failed states list. To make matters difficult, many states in the region
are rather unstable and a few are at a high risk of being classified as failed states (Mejia,
2010b).
4.4 - Lessons for the Gulf of Guinea Countries in developing a Maritime Security
Framework to Combat Piracy
Based on the lessons learnt from the experiences of combating piracy in Southeast Asia
and Somalia region the formulation of a maritime security strategy framework is
considered the first step to combat piracy and tackle the identified challenges
confronting the Gulf of Guinea countries. Ng (2011) developed an anti-piracy
framework (see Appendix B) were the affected areas are categorized into land, territorial
seas and international waters. The important aspects of this framework is where littoral
states provide enabling legislation for prosecution of pirates on land and territorial
waters as well as international support is seen to be critical to states with weak
coastguards and navies. In addition user states and stakeholders collaborate to provide a
secured maritime environment for commercial shipping. Some lessons from ReCAAP
and DCoC to combat piracy and mitigate identified challenges in the Gulf of Guinea are
presented below.
4.4.1- Review of National Legislation
All countries should ascribe to international conventions against piracy and facilitate
domestication of UNCLOS 1982 and SUA 1988 provisions to overcome legal obstacles
that hinder individual nations in combating piracy. The review of national legislation
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could mitigate the challenges of inadequate legislation in the Gulf of Guinea countries.
The United Nations offices in West Africa (UNOWA) and UNODC should assist states
in the region to harmonize their laws dealing with piracy and armed robbery against
ships. The IMO circular letter No.3180 of 17 May 2011 containing information and
guidance on elements of international law relating to piracy might be useful (IMO,
2011). In addition, the Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and Maritime violence
prepared by Comité Maritime International is a useful starting point tool in this regard
(Beckman,2002,p.333).
4.4.2 - Establishment of an Information Sharing Centre to enhance Inter -Agency
Coordination
The enhancement of interagency cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea could mitigate the
challenge of poor interagency cooperation among states. Designating focal points and
establishment of an information sharing center is considered desirable to this end. Focal
points could enhance interagency cooperation by (1) managing all piracy and armed
robbery incidents within its territorial waters, (2) acting as point of contact for the ISC,
(3) facilitating its country law enforcement investigation and coordinating surveillance
and enforcement for piracy and armed robbery with neighbouring focal points (Ho,
2008). The focal points could be the country’s coast guard, marine police, navy, port
authority, maritime administration or customs (Ho, 2005). The ISC could be located at
the Regional Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Centre in Lagos, Nigeria. The
choice of Nigeria is because as at now Nigeria is in the forefront of the antipiracy fight,
and it is where most of the pirates operate from. The ISC could be made up of
government and ship industry stakeholders from participating states especially naval,
coast guards and legal personnel to facilitate exchange of information.
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4.4.3 - Collaborative Funding
An Agreement could serve as a vehicle for technical support and funding of maritime
security activities in a region. Therefore the establishment of a maritime security fund
likened to the current ECOWAS Peace Fund could mitigate the challenge of inadequate
funding. The aim is to source for funds to enable states to combat piracy effectively.
Initially, Gulf of Guinea countries could be persuaded to contribute 1 percent of their
annual earnings from crude oil sales for the acquisition and joint production programme
of appropriate mix of platforms and maritime domain surveillance assets. Financial
assistance could also be made by international organizations, user states, maritime
stakeholders and ship-owners to help reduce burden on weak states.
4.4.4 - Adoption of Best Management Practices
Analysis from the Horn of Africa reveals 65 per cent of attacks were foiled by efforts of
merchant ships themselves (Ng, 2011, p.8). According to IMB reports described earlier,
anti-piracy watches by ship masters in the Gulf of Guinea was a contributory factor in
the reduction of piracy. Taking into account unavailability of naval presence in some sea
areas, it is important ocean going vessels, ship owners adopt self-protective measures. It
is on this premise that IMO recommended Best Management Practices should be
adopted.
4.5 - Other Strategies to Combat Piracy
As mentioned earlier integrated maritime security strategies comprise not only an
effective regional cooperation mechanism but other important elements as well. Some of
these are public enlightenment on maritime issues, enhancement of political will and
provision of adequate fleet maintenance facilities.
4.5.1 - Public Enlightenment on Maritime Issues/Affairs
Public enlightenment on maritime issues could mitigate the challenge of poor maritime
domain awareness. Public enlightenment could be a step in curbing the problem of sea
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blindness in the region. Both leaders and the public in general should be educated
through conferences, seminars and workshops on the economic importance of the
maritime environment and the need to be stakeholders in the prosperity of any maritime
project. In addition, the enlightenment on various maritime security challenges gives a
better understanding of the magnitude of threats in the maritime environment.
4.5.2 - Enhancement of Political Will
The enhancement of political will is critical to the success of any maritime security
strategy. Leaders must be properly educated to know the economic importance of the
maritime environment for economic prosperity. The objective is to win political support
for improved funding of maritime security activities. According to Gilpin (2007), given
the transnational character of maritime security threats, political will must be expressed
regionally. Countries should be willing to cede sovereignty concerns to advance regional
solutions (Gilpin, 2007). The Nigeria /Benin Operation Prosperity is a step in the
direction to show a demonstrable political will. In a similar vein, the African Union is at
the verge of creating a maritime security department. The ECCAS and ECOWAS
prospects of cooperation are another sign of enhanced political will in the Gulf of
Guinea.
4.5.3 - Provision of Adequate Fleet Maintenance Facilities
The provision of adequate fleet maintenance facilities could mitigate the challenge of
poor technological base. The objective is to put in place repair and maintenance facilities
to achieve capacity for sustained maritime security patrols. One of the biggest challenges
faced by Nigeria that led to increase in piracy was the poor operational state of ships
which lacked necessary refit. The existing dockyards and shipyards in the region would
require urgent rehabilitation to make them meet international standards. This could be
achieved through the encouragement of local and foreign companies to invest in the
regions´ dockyards and shipyards.
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4.6 – ECOWAS as a Mechanism to Implement Regional Agreements
Regional Economic establishments such as ECOWAS are most apt to assist states with
common attributes such as similar legal systems and current socio economic conditions
to implement a regional agreement to combat piracy. Through these existing regional
mechanisms increased, national, bilateral and trilateral initiatives can be initiated
(Fouché, 2010b, p.152).
ECOWAS is a regional organization of 15 West African countries. The countries are
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire,the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea –
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Its main goal is
the promotion of the economic integration among its members. ECOWAS is one the five
regional pillars of the African Economic Community (ECOWAS, 2012). ECOWAS
through its Technical commission for Transport, fulfill its obligations to instruments of
the African Union, such as the African Union Maritime Transport Charter which calls
for the harmonization of laws relating to maritime security and assisting states (Fouché,
2010b, p.157). ECOWAS therefore has the framework to operationalize these suggested
maritime security strategies in the short, medium and long terms.
4.7 - Conclusion
The Chapter identified regional cooperation as the main thrust of a strategy to combat a
transnational crime like piracy. The UN and IMO have emphasized regional cooperation
in their resolutions in view of challenges or obstacles that may arise in the course of
implementing anti-piracy strategies. A review of two existing arrangements to combat
piracy-ReCAAP and DCoC reveal information sharing, capacity building, cooperative
arrangements and International assistance as key to any successful anti-piracy effort.
Particularly important are domestication of the SUA 1988 Convention and protocols,
collaborative funding, best management practices and inter agency cooperation. The
ECOWAS currently has the institutional framework to implement these strategies to
combat piracy off the waters of West Africa.
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Chapter 5
5 - Conclusion
Piracy, which started since man commenced commerce at sea, has become a threat to
world trade and global maritime security. Mostly recently, the contemporary hot spots of
piracy are in Africa namely the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea/West African
waters. The Gulf of Guinea known for its strategic importance in terms of oil
exploitation and rich fauna and closeness to the western world for supply of oil is being
threatened by gangs of pirates. Benin republic which only had two reported piracy
attacks between1991 and 2010, was severely affected by 20 pirate attacks in 2011. This
situation almost brought the economy of Benin to its knees. As a consequence, several
measures have been introduced to curb piracy most notably, Operation Prosperity, the
Nigerian/Benin maritime patrol. This patrol reduced the rate of pirate attacks in 2012.
Despite these efforts piracy still persists in the Gulf of Guinea, with pirates extending
further to Togo.
The impact of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea can be said to reverberate around the world
due to the fact that attacks on oil tankers and bulk carriers, would definitely raise
insurance premiums, additional costs for ship owners for transiting the Gulf of Guinea
and ultimately high cost of goods. Attacks on oil tankers, can cause environmental
disasters or even hike in world oil prices, which would be shown on pump price of fuel
in countries thousands of miles from the Gulf of Guinea. Most importantly, the human
cost of piracy is not calculable because of the trauma to seafarers and their families.
Therefore, the term hostis humani generis or enemy of mankind makes it a duty for the
global community to tackle this common menace.
Several factors have been identified as contributory to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
including proliferation of small arms, conflict and disorder, geography and promise of
reward. Apart from geography which cannot be altered, the other factors stem from
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socio-economic and political short comings in the region. Piracy in the region therefore
has an interrelationship with these factors.
This dissertation has attempted to build a case that

regional cooperation is a sine qua

non to combat piracy in most piracy hot spots. However, several difficulties or
challenges do exist in the region which can be obstacles to cooperation. They include
maritime border disputes, lack of political will, and lack of naval capacity. Others
include influence of extra-regional powers and lack of interagency cooperation.
Therefore a common interest must be identified before cooperation can be meaningful.
Indeed, there are numerous solutions and measures to counter piracy, the dissertation
identified some counter measures used in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa to
repress piracy. The ReCAAP has been praised by many as a model of regional
agreement to combat piracy. Its strengths and limitations were analysed to provide
lessons to develop a regional anti-piracy framework in the Gulf of Guinea. Other counter
measures examined were the MALSINDO patrols, EiS initiative and the Djibouti Code
of Conduct as well as the international responses to piracy in Somalia. Thus the
framework for regional cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea will include collaboration,
coordination, information sharing and capacity building. The coordinated and
cooperative approach used in tackling piracy has been acclaimed, because it would be
difficult to eliminate modern day piracy unless the root causes are addressed and all the
littoral states and stake holders are on board-hence a holistic approach.
In combating piracy, key strategies are vital to mitigate identified challenges; they
include enhancement of interagency cooperation, review of national legislation,
collaborative funding and adoption of IMO best management practices. Others include
public enlightenment on maritime issues, enhancement of political will and provision of
adequate fleet repair facilities for effective policing operations.
In conclusion, since piracy is a transnational crime and no individual state has the
resources to combat piracy, emphasis should be put on a sustainable regional
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cooperation. This is where the ECOWAS, as a lead organization, MOWCA, IMO and
the United Nations can work together to suppress piracy and enhance maritime security
in the Gulf of Guinea. If the Gulf of Guinea states together with the rest of international
community fail to contain piracy in the Region, the Gulf of Guinea may very well
become the latest to fall in a domino effect of sea areas where maritime commerce is
held hostage by pirates.
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